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The collapse of communism, decline of socialism, and deregula-
tion of markets provoked rethinking of economic law. This Article
carries that line of thought to law in general. I develop an account
of decentralized law, which percolates up from the bottom, as
opposed to centralized law, which is imposed from above. Decen-
tralized law begins with customs and contracts. I use game theory
to develop an analysis of custom. According to economic theory,
the justification of regulation begins with the identification of a
failure in the incentive structure of markets. Similarly, I argue that
the justification for centralized law begins with the identification of
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Article draws upon a related paper, Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the
New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215
(1994). I am grateful for comments from Paul Edwards, Wolfgang Fikentscher, Goran
Hagg, Claus Ott, Richard Posner, Daniel Rubinfeld, and Hans-Bernd Schafer.
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a failure in the incentive structure of social norms. Much of this
Article concerns why some norms succeed and others fail relative to
the standard of fairness and efficiency.
Part I is an extensive introduction to my major themes. Part II
sketches the foundations of a theory of social norms by combining
philosophical concepts and game theory. Part III uses this theory
to characterize conditions under which fair and efficient norms will
evolve and then shows how judges and other lawmakers can use this
information.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Legal Centrism
The Soviet magazine Crocodile published a cartoon that depicted
a cart containing one gigantic nail being pulled by some men, one
of whom was saying to a bystander, "What's it for? We don't know
what it's for, but it satisfies our nail quota for the month." This
cartoon epitomizes the economic critique of central planning,
according to which a planned economy does not generate the
information or motivation required for economic efficiency.' Like
the workers in the cartoon, the people and enterprises under
socialism often lack the knowledge and the will to produce valuable
goods.
Central planning is a way of making law, not just commodities.
To implement the central plan, officials must have the power to
allocate resources. To possess this power, the orders issued by
planning officials at the top must trump the rights of property and
contract enjoyed by people and enterprises at the bottom. Thus
public law crowds out private law.
Only communist dictatorships have practiced central planning
as a total system. Democracies, however, sometimes adopt pro-
cedures similar to central planning to solve specific economic
problems. To illustrate, when Professor Richard Stewart stepped
down from his position as the highest-ranking environmental
lawyer in the Department of Justice, he remarked that "America's
environmental laws are based upon Soviet-style centralized plan-
' This critique was developed in the 1930s in the debate between Oscar Lange and
Abba Lerner. See ABBA P. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL: PRINCIPLES OF
WELFARE ECONOMICS 23-40 (1944). See generally OSKAR LANGE, ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC
PLANNING (2d ed. 1967); OSKAR LANGE & FRED M. TAYLOR, ON THE ECONOMIC
THEORY OF SOCIAuSM (Benjamin E. Lippincott ed. 1964).
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ning."2 He meant that America controls pollution through a
system of quotas imposed upon businesses by federal officials.
Such procedures have been called "command-and-control" regula-
tions .
3
The imperative theory of law, which has a long history in legal
philosophy, defines "law" as a command backed by a threat.4 This
tradition builds upon the fact that many laws impose obligations
and attach sanctions to their violation. Similarly, the paradigm for
centralized lawmaking is a decree, in which government officials
formulate the state's goal, embody the goal in a rule, and force
people to conform to it. Information and motivation move along
a one-way street from the top to the bottom.
Rather than proceeding from top to bottom, lawmaking can
proceed from bottom to top.5 Decentralized lawmaking has several
forms. To illustrate, one form induces people to create a market by
assigning property rights, such as the tradable emissions rights
created by recent amendments to the Clean Air Act.6 The subject
of this Article is another form of decentralized lawmaking: enacting
custom. To illustrate, courts may determine fault and liability for
accidents by applying the norms of the community in which the
I am grateful to Professor Don Elliott of Yale University for this quotation.
sSee CHARLES L. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 13 (1977)
(describing a "regulatory apparatus" grafted "onto the system of incentive-oriented
private enterprise"); see also STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 1 (1982)
("Beginning in the mid-1960s ... [t]he federal government began ... to impose
significant controls upon environmental pollution.").
" Alternatively, this tradition defines "law" as an order backed by a threat. For a
review of this tradition, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM 95 (1970).
s Classic writings on decentralized law include 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION
AND LIBERTY 72-91 (1973); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72-87
(1944); BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 95-111 (expanded 3d ed. 1991). For
application to the integration of law in Western Europe, see MANFRED E. STREIT &
WERNER MUSSLER, THE ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY-
FROM "ROME" TO "MAASTRICHT" (Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von
Wirtschaftssystemen Jena Doc. IUE 72/94 (COL 23), 1994); MANFRED E. STRErr &
WERNER MUSSLER, EUROPEAN LAW IN CONTEXT: CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (European University Institute Colloquium Papers
Doc. IUE 72/94 (COL 23), 1994). For an application to Eastern Europe, see Paul H.
Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
1, 25-34 (1994).
6 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For a review of theory and practice,
see TOM TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 38-63,
263-343 (1984). Other examples of law-inducing markets are patent and copyright
law and the allocation of the electromagnetic spectrum.
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accident occurred. When courts apply community standards, they
find law, rather than make it.
Many scholars have detected a movement in modern history
from decentralized to centralized law. John Salmond concluded that
customary law is important in the early stages of legal development,
but gradually cedes its place to statutes when "the state has grown
to its full strength."' In a recent article, Ott and Schafer point
out that modern German law has moved away from customary law
and toward statutes.' Many intellectuals believe that centralized
law is inevitable, just as they once believed that socialism was
inevitable.
In fact, centralized law, like socialism, is not even plausible for
a technologically advanced society. The forces that reversed the
trend toward socialism and destroyed central planning are also
undermining legal centrism. An advanced economy involves the
production of too many commodities for anyone to manage or
regulate. As the economy develops, the information and incentive
constraints tighten upon public policy. These facts suggest that
efficiency requires decentralization to become more important, not
less, as economies become more complex. Specifically, efficiency
requires that as economies develop, the enforcement of custom in
business communities becomes more important relative to the
regulation of business.
B. New Law Merchant
A community of people is a social network whose mem-
bers develop relationships with each other through repeated inter-
actions. The modern economy creates many specialized business
communities. These communities may form around a technology
such as computer software, a body of knowledge such as account-
ing, or a particular product such as credit cards. Wherever there
are communities, norms arise to coordinate the interaction of
people.9 The formality of the norms varies from one business to
7 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, SALMOND ONJURISPRUDENCE 234 (11th ed. 1957).
' See Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd Schafer, Emergence and Construction of Efficient
Rules in the Legal System of German Civil Law (1991) (paper presented to the
European Law and Economics Association) (on file with author). In making these
remarks, they are describing history, not passing judgment upon it.
9 See, e.g., MICHAEL TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY AND LIBERTY 65-90 (1982)
(arguing that community is "a necessary condition for the maintenance of stateless
social order"); MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 21-30 (1987)
[hereinafter TAYLOR, POSSIBILITY] (explaining that a group "can wield with great
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another. Self-regulating professions, like law and accounting,
and formal networks like Visa ° promulgate their own rules.
Voluntary associations, like the Association of Home Appliance
Manufacturers, issue guidelines.' Informal networks, such as
the computer software manufacturers, have inchoate ethical
standards.
Following private international law,12 I refer to all such norms
of business communities as the "new law merchant.""3 The new
law merchant arises outside of the state's apparatus for making law.
Lawmakers, however, are pulled into the affairs of business
communities by insiders who look to the state to resolve their
disputes. Lawmakers are also pushed into the affairs of business
communities by outside critics of private wealth and power. This
Article concerns the appropriate response of the state's lawmakers
to these pulls and pushes.
The traditional account of the "law merchant," from which
the phrase "new law merchant" is adapted, provides a model
for how lawmakers might respond. The merchants in the medieval
trade fairs of England developed their own courts and practices
to regulate trade.'4 The extent to which the medieval law mer-
effectiveness a range of positive and negative sanctions, including the sanctions of
approval and disapproval"); EDNA ULLMANN-MARcAL1T, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS
76 (1977) ("[N]orms solve recurrent co-ordination problems . . . ."). Eric Posner
argues that groups, as opposed to categories of people, spontaneously regulate
themselves. See Eric A. Posner, Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds: A
Comment, 144 U. PA. L. REV 1697, 1699-1701 (1996); see also Rubin, supra note 5, at
7-13 (finding that laws "must also be consistent with existing institutions in an
economy").
" The Visa payments network is actually divided into two corporations: one for
American transactions and the other for international transactions. See, e.g.,JohnJ.
Duffy, 17-Nation Pact Unifies Payment Systems, AM. BANKER, May 25, 1988, at 1, 1 ("In
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, Visa is now a local autonomous unit run by a
board of Visa banks ... [h]eadquarter[ed] ... in London."). Each corporation has
a set of operating rules, which are published proprietary documents.
1 See DAVID HEMENWAY, INDUSTRYWIDE VOLUNTARY PRODUCT STANDARDS 83
(1975).
12 For discussions of norms in private international law, see Yves Dezalay & Bryant
Garth, Merchants of Law As Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing InternationalJustice from
the Competition for Transnational Business Disputes, 29 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 27 (1995).
"' The term has also been applied more restrictively to norms of international
trade invoked in arbitration and mediation ("lex mercatoria"). See FIUIP DE LY,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA 207-88 (1992) (outlining the
development of the theory of "lex mercatoria" as applied to international business
law).
14 See Avner Greif et al., Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the
Merchant Guild, 102J. POL. ECON. 745, 750-62 (1994); Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role
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chant was substantive, rather than procedural, is disputed, and its
relationship with common law and admiralty law is difficult
to reconstruct. In any case, as the English legal system became
stronger and more unified, English judges increasingly assumed
jurisdiction over disputes among merchants. The English judges
often did not know enough about these specialized businesses
to evaluate alternative rules. 5  Instead of making rules, the
English judges allegedly tried to discover those rules that
already existed among the merchants, and then selectively en-
forced them. Thus, the judges dictated conformity to mer-
chant practices, not the practices to which merchants should
conform.
A well-documented example concerns the assimilation of
financial instruments, especially notes and bills of exchange, into
the common law in the eighteenth century. Notes and bills of
exchange, which circulated among eighteenth-century merchants as
means of payment and credit, raised difficult questions of risk
allocation. To illustrate, suppose that A delivers goods to B. Upon
receipt of the goods, B gives a note to A promising to pay a certain
sum of money on a future date. A sells B's note to C. In the mean
time, B discovers a defect in the goods that he purchased. Now B
holds defective goods, and C holds B's promise to pay for them.
Can B refuse to pay C on the grounds that A delivered defective
goods? Or, alternatively, must B pay C and then sue A for breach
of contract?
Such legal questions became acute with the rapid expansion
of commerce in the eighteenth century. Judge Mansfield is
usually credited with supplying most of the answers. Mansfield
knew that he did not understand fully how businesses use finan-
cial instruments. Consequently, he did not try to invent better
rules than the ones in practice. Rather, he carefully scrutinized
business transactions and tried to identify and enforce the best
practices." His elegant solutions were taught in courses on
of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant Private Judges, and the
Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 1-23 (1990); see also Avner Greif, Reputation and
Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence from the Geniza Documents, Berkeley
Seminar on Institutional Economics (Oct. 1989).
"s Wolfgang Fikentscher once remarked to me, "The decisions of the Munich
traffic court of appeals concerning motor vehicle accidents improved markedly after
the judges learned to drive."
The traditional account is developed inJ.M. HOLDEN, HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAw 27-36 (1955). Holden is criticized in J.H. Baker,
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commercial law long after the relevant financial instruments ceased
circulating.'
7
In common law systems, intensive litigation alerts judges to the
need to change the law."8 Empirical evidence indicates an intensi-
fication of litigation around the time that judges adopt a new
precedent. 9 Judges respond to a proliferation of novel disputes
by making new law.2" Thus, the priorities for legal development
in a common law system are determined by litigation rates. When
judges make common law, however, they cannot do as they
please.2' According to an old principle in jurisprudence, judges
cannot make law except when they find a social norm worthy of
enforcement by the state. This principle is embodied in the saying,
"Judges mustfind common law."22 Thus Judge Mansfield examined
The Law Merchant and the Common Law Before 1700, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 295, 296-99
(1979). A revised view, which stresses that Mansfield immersed himself in the
minutiae of business practice in order to extract the best principles from it, is found
inJAMES S. ROGERS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES: A STUDY
OF THE ORIGINS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LAW 210-22 (1995). I benefited
from discussions on this point with Dan Coquillette,James Gordley, andJim Rogers.
1 I refer especially to Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which was
taught in American law schools long after the instruments to which it applied ceased
to circulate.
'8 Models of the evolution of the common law toward efficiency are often
based upon a bias in litigation favoring more intensive and extensive challenges
to inefficient laws. The first paper developing this idea was Paul H. Rubin, Why Is
the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). For a review of pro-
posed mechanisms and their mathematical testing, see Robert Cooter & Lewis
Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help ofJudges?, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 139 (1980).
9 See George Priest, Measuring Legal Change, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 193,
193-225 (1987). Note, however, that the evidence is unclear as to whether intensified
litigation precedes a new precedent, follows one, or both. See Robert D. Cooter, Why
Litigants Disagree: A Comment on George Priest's 'Measuring Legal Change, 3 J.L. ECON.
& ORGANIZATION 227, 227-34 (1987).
20 See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 5-6 (1988).
21 This is the subject of a famous critique of H.L.A. Hart's theory of positive law
by Ronald Dworkin. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-45 (1977);
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 181-207 (1961).
2 For an exposition of this old view of lawmaking, see JOHN DAvIES, LE PRIMER
REPORT DES CASES ET MATTERS EN LEY RESOLUES ET ADIUDGES EN LES COURTS DEL
ROY EN IRELAND (1615), reprinted in DINE RIGHT AND DEMOCRACY: AN ANTHOLOGY
OF POLITICAL WRITING IN STUART ENGLAND 131 (David Wootton ed., 1986). In a
recent article, Edward Rubin traces this line of thought to a belief in medieval Europe
that law is at once divine and natural. See Edward Rubin, Congress As a Bureaucratic
Supervisor, Seminar on Law, Economics, and Organizations (Fall 1995); see also
STANLEY CHODOROW, CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THEORY AND CHURCH POLITICS IN THE
MID-TWELFTH CENTURY: THE ECCLESIOLOGY OF GRATIAN'S DECRETUM 211-46 (1972);
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the commercial practices of his day in order to find the foundations
of modern commercial law.
Since the eighteenth century, common law countries have
developed new institutions to aid the law's evolution. Organizations
conduct studies to scrutinize current law and issue reports recom-
mending changes to it. In Britain, the law commissions perform
these tasks,23 and in America these tasks belong to the American
Law Institute (ALI) and the National Commission on Uniform State
Laws (NCUSL).24 To illustrate the work of these bodies, the ALI
periodically creates ad hoc committees of scholars and lawyers to
restate the best practices of courts in particular areas of law, such
as the Restatement of Torts or the Restatement of Contracts. Restate-
ments serve as references for judges, thus increasing uniformity
across jurisdictions and probably increasing the pace of legal
change. As products and technology change, business communities
continually generate new social norms. Organizations like the ALI
and the NCUSL try to keep law current with developments in
business communities.
C. Codes and Regulations
In the eighteenth century, a debate was joined in England over
whether the common law was efficient or an archaic residue of
obsolete practices. 25 The reforming spirit prevailed in continental
Europe, where common law was identified with the losing side in
the revolutions that brought Napoleon and his followers to power.
The victorious revolutionaries, who regarded judges with suspicion
for upholding the old regime, wanted to uproot "medieval"
practices and replace them with "rational" ones.26 The revolution-
HEINRICH FICHTENAU, LIVING IN THE TENTH CENTURY: MENTALITIES AND SOCIAL
ORDERS 403-39 (PatrickJ. Geary trans., 1991); EWART LEWIS, MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
IDEAS 1-87 (1954). This older view finds an echo in the jurisprudence of Ronald
Dworkin, who asserts that courts should find rights and not make policy. See
DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 184-205.
' See Anthony Ogus, Economics and Law Reform: Thirty Years of Law Commission
Endeavour, 111 LAW Q. REv. 407, 409-12 (1995) (analyzing "law reform agencies and
their goals").
24 See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995) (explaining the role served by the ALI and
the NCUSL and describing these organizations).
2 This debate was joined in the famous attacks of Jeremy Bentham on the
common law. For a modern discussion that rehashes this old debate, see Richard A.
Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 103-40
(1979).
26
See PHILIP DAwSON, PROVINCIAL MAGISTRATES AND REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS
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aries proclaimed that law derived its authority from the popular will
as expressed through legislators, not from social norms as found by
judges. The popular will was identified with rationality, whereas
social norms were identified with arbitrary habits. Commissions
were appointed to draft codes to supersede the common law.
Scholars on the commissions examined pre-revolutionary law with
a critical eye and retained some parts of it, rejecting the rest.
27
Legislators enacted the codes into law.
Compared to common law countries, the codifiers in civil law
countries apparently have more influence and the judges less.
Comparative lawyers, however, debate whether this apparent
difference in the two systems is real or illusory. 21 Judges allegedly
make law in civil systems by interpreting codes, not finding social
norms. Interpreting some codes, however, looks a lot like finding
social norms.
To illustrate, consider a code that I alluded to earlier. I already
discussed the fact that the ALI and the NCUSL create committees
to restate the common law in the United States.29 In addition,
these bodies create committees to draft model codes."0 The most
successful example is the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the
vast majority of which applies to contracts among merchants,
financial instruments, and bankruptcy. Its drafting was directed by
Professor Karl Llewellyn, who tried to identify and articulate the
IN FRANCE, 1789-1795, at 241-74 (1972).
1 For the history and origins of civil law, see RENE DAVID &JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY,
MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY OF LAW (3d ed. 1985); PHILIP DAWSON, PROVINCIAL MAGISTRATES AND
REVOLUTIONARY POLmTCs IN FRANCE, 1789-1795 (1972); JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE
CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN
EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (2d ed. 1985); FREDERICK H. LAWSON, A COMMON
LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW (1953); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz,
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAw (Tony Weir trans., 2d rev. ed. 1992).
2' The dispute is difficult to resolve because, in reality, neither system exists as a
pure type. In common law countries, restatements and codes have legal authority,
andjudges in civil law countries are influenced by social norms. For alternative views,
see Symposium, Economic Analysis in Civil Law Countries: Past, Present, Future, 11 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 261 (1991); see also Christian Kirchner, The Difficult Reception of Law
and Economics in Germany, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 277, 277 (1991) (analyzing and
predicting"the future success of law and economics in the German legal order"); Ugo
Mattei & Robert Pardolesi, Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries: A Comparative
Approach, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 265, 265 (1991) (arguing that "only a false image
of the differences between legal families leads one to believe that [economic analysis
of the law] may find difficulties within the civil law orbit").
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
o See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 24, at 596.
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best commercial practices in contemporary business communities,
much like Judge Mansfield when he modernized British commercial
law.3 1 After Llewellyn's committees completed their work, the
UCC was presented to the legislatures of the American states, all of
which eventually enacted it into law. When legislation and common
law apply to the same case, legislation prevails, so the UCC
displaced much of the common law for commercial transactions.
judges continue to make commercial law by interpreting the UCC.
Furthermore, many provisions of the UCC are based upon insight
into the best commercial practices. Consequently, making law by
interpretation of the UCC closely resembles the process by which
common law evolved.
Both common law and civil codes rely heavily upon broad
principles that apply in many different circumstances. These
principles ideally abstract from particular practices, and the
practices give specific content to the principles. To illustrate, the
common law of torts typically holds injufers liable for accidents
caused by their negligence; judges give this general principle
specific content by reference to the actual standards by which
particular communities evaluate accidents. Civil law judges can
proceed on similar lines when interpreting general principles in a
code. For example, "negligence" in civil law can receive specific
content by reference to community practices. The reliance on
specific practices to interpret general principles allows both systems
of law to empower judges to make law from community norms.
In the twentieth century, a massive growth of new law in
the industrial countries of Europe and America created the
regulatory state. The regulatory state replaced some old laws
with new regulations. For example, it hastened the substitution
of criminal codes for the common law of crimes, and it insti-
tuted new bodies of law including administrative law. As before,
I focus on the process of making regulations, not upon the
substance.
As explained, a community of scholars, lawyers, and judges
typically produces the common law and much of the civil law. In
"' See generally Ingrid M. Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's
Attempt to Achieve The Good, The True, The Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J.
1141,1141-84(1985). "Llewellyn sculpted the merchant rules to bring 'the beautiful'
to commercial law and commercial practice. To Llewellyn's eye, legal beauty lay in
functional rules-rules that could guide businessmen in conducting their business
affairs .... " Id. at 1147 (footnotes omitted).
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contrast, politicians and bureaucrats have more influence upon
regulations. Regulations can come from the legislature, the
executive, or the bureaucracy. Legislatures produce regulations by
familiar processes: committee hearings, debates, bargaining, and
majority voting. Executives promulgate rules directly by issuing
orders or indirectly by having ministries issue regulations. Minis-
tries usually follow procedures prescribed in legislation for making
regulations, which differ across agencies as well as countries.3 2
Thus, when agencies create new regulations, they must follow
procedures stipulated in the legislation conveying authority upon
them, or, in the absence of such stipulations, they must follow
procedures prescribed in the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA). 3 To illustrate, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
must follow procedures specified in the Environmental Protection
Act when making regulations, or, in the absence of specific
legislative instructions, it must follow the APA.
While the common law and codes rely heavily upon general
principles whose specific content comes from community practices,
regulations are imposed from the top-they lack a foundation in
community practices. Without such a foundation, the regulators
would create uncertainty by promulgating general principles. Thus,
instead of promulgating general principles, regulations rely more
heavily upon explicit, detailed instructions. For example, instead of
requiring the rungs of ladders to be "reasonably strong" or "strong
enough for their intended purposes," a regulation might specify
exactly how many kilograms of vertical weight a rung must be
capable of supporting.
According to settled legal principles, legislation trumps the
common law whenever they conflict. Consequently, regulations
crowd out private law in the common law countries. To illustrate,
American workers typically work forty hours per week. Federal law
requires workers to receive 150% for "over-time work," defined as
more than forty hours per week. Regulation of the employment
contract prevents the employer and employee from stipulating the
52 For a comparative study of German and American administrative law, see Susan
Rose-Ackerman, American Administrative Law Under Siege: Is Germany a Model?, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1279 (1994).
" The APA distinguishes two fundamental types of procedures for two different
types of regulations, called "adjudicatory regulations" and "legislative regulations."
This distinction is developed especially in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 401,414 (1971) and VermontYankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542 (1978).
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terms of work that both of them prefer, such as working fifty hours
one week and thirty hours the next week.'
D. Structural Adjudication
Many legal reformers have sought to replace custom with
systematic statutes. Underpinning these reform proposals is a
theory about why regressive customs should be replaced by
progressive statutes. Hart distinguishes laws into rules controlling
people ("primary rules") and rules controlling rules ("secondary
rules")., 5 Primary rules guide the behavior of citizens in a state as
they go about their daily lives. For instance, motorists are forbid-
den to exceed sixty-five miles per hour on most American roads.
Secondary rules guide the behavior of state officials as they make,
revise, repeal, or apply primary rules. For example, a bill becomes
federal law in America when enacted by both houses of Congress
and signed by the president. According to Hart's theory, the union
of primary and secondary rules defines law.3" Unlike law, custom
lacks secondary rules. Custom does not prescribe procedures for
making, revising, or repealing itself. Custom has no constitution
or judges. A person who wants to change custom must use
whatever means are at hand to convince others to follow different
norms.
To illustrate, the Tolai in Papua New Guinea formerly recog-
nized the power of the "big man" in the village to allocate land.
Once a market for land developed, this norm exposed villagers to
the risk that the big man would sell land to outsiders for personal
gain. So the Tolai stopped recognizing such power in the big man.
The big man lost the power to sell land as soon as the Tolai no
longer recognized it. Instead of the old norm, the Tolai recognized
the new norm that everyone in the village must agree to the sale of
its land. This change in customary law was endorsed by the land
courts.37
s See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994). The Act provides
minimum wages for "covered" employees and also requires that certain employees
(not necessarily the same ones) receive time and one-half their "regular rate" of pay
for hours worked in excess of 40 in any "workweek.'
" See HART, supra note 21, at 77-96.
36 See id. at 114.
s7 See Robert D. Cooter, Inventing Market Property: The Land Courts of Papua New
Guinea, 25 LAw & Soc'y REv. 759, 788 (1991) (discussing a 1987 Papau New Guinea
Land Court case called Malakit v. Tobung).
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Customs arise, whereas laws are made.' Hart concluded that
custom tends to be inflexible because it is not under anyone's
rational control.3 9 Hart correctly observed that the absence of a
prescribed procedure for changing custom can frustrate its reform
in some circumstances." In other circumstances, however, the
ability to change custom without going through formal procedures
gives it more flexibility than law. To stand Hart's conclusion on its
head, note that custom arises from consensus, not politics. A
consensus can change without going through costly procedures that
are vulnerable to special interests. Thus, a custom can disappear
without being repealed or change without being amended. Thus,
the Tolai did not have to launch a lobbying campaign or overcome
political contributions by the big men in order to change their
customs regulating the sale of land. From this perspective, customs
should be more flexible than statutes.
Hartes critique of custom resembles a socialist's critique of
markets. Socialists observe that prices arise, whereas plans are
made, and conclude that markets must be inefficient because prices
are not determined by deliberation and reasoning. The basic
confusion concerns the difference between individual rationality and
social efficiency. Individual rationality generally requires delibera-
tion and planning, but social efficiency does not. Research in
industrial organization shows that the efficiency or inefficiency of
markets is often determined by their structure.41 Similarly, the
efficiency or inefficiency of custom often depends upon the
incentive structure producing it. In the language of game theory,
the payoff matrix determines the possible equilibria.
These facts suggest how lawmakers, especially courts, should
respond to the new law merchant. I propose that modern law-
makers should respond to the new law merchant much like the
' See HART, supra note 21, at 89-96.
39 See id. at 89-91.40 See id. at 90-91.
41 One of the intellectual foundations of American antitrust law is the distinction
among industry structure, conduct of firms, and economic performance. SeeJoE S.
BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 515-79 (2d ed. 1968); RICHARD E. CAVES, AMERICAN
INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE 84-102 (5th ed. 1982). For
applications to mergers, see Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Consider-
ations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1580, 1587-1651 (1983); Lawrence A.
Sullivan, The New Merger Guidelines: AnAftenard, 71 CAL. L. REV. 632, 632-43 (1983).
This distinction came under attack as game theory was applied to industrial
organization. My term "structural approach" refers to the incentive structure of
games, not to the competitiveness of markets.
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alleged response of English judges to the old law merchant.
Modern lawmakers, however, should take explicit account of
insights from modern economics. First, lawmakers should identify
actual norms that have arisen in specialized business communities.
Second, lawmakers should identify the incentive structure that
produced those norms. Third, the efficiency of the incentive
structure should be evaluated using analytical tools from economics.
Those norms arising from an efficient incentive structure, as
ascertained by tests that economists apply to games, should be
enforced. I call this procedure the "structural approach" to
adjudicating social norms.
The structural approach conflicts with much writing in the
economic analysis of law in two respects. First, lawmakers following
the structural approach infer the efficiency or inefficiency of a
norm, rather than measuring it directly. In contrast, much of the
economic analysis of law commends the evaluation of legal rules by
cost-benefit techniques. For example, at the end of his classic
article, Ronald Coase recommends that judges choose among
alternative liability rules by comparing their costs and benefits."
Second, the structural approach that I develop applies to norms,
not regularities. To illustrate the difference, men take off their hats
when they enter a furnace room or a church." Taking off your hat
to escape the heat is different from taking off your hat to satisfy an
obligation. The former is a regularity and the latter is a norm. A
regularity results from an inclination, whereas a norm imposes an
obligation.
Using "norm" to refer to obligations is standard usage among
philosophers," and some game theorists also use the term this
way.4 5 In contrast, social scientists sometimes use "norm" differ-
ently, to refer to average behavior. For example, sociologists
sometimes use "norm" to mean what people normally do, as
opposed to what deviants do. Similarly, statisticians talk about the
"normal distribution." People commonly put on hats in a blizzard,
42 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1, 42-44 (1960).
An exception to the enthusiasm forjudicial cost-benefit analysis is Richard Epstein's
view that judges ought not to have so much discretion. See Richard A. Epstein, The
Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 469, 469-72 (1987).
"' Equivalently, men put on a hat in a snowstorm or a synagogue.
44 1 adopt the language and much of the theory of norms developed by the
philosopher GEORG H. VON WRIGHT, NORM AND ACTION: A LOGICAL ENQUIRY
(1963).46 See ULLMANN-MARGALrT, supra note 9, at 12-13.
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so this behavior is normal, but it is not a "norm" as I use the term
in this Article.
What difference does this distinction make? Economic models
seldom distinguish between inclinations and obligations. For the
purposes of most studies of markets, the difference can be ignored.
I will argue, however, that the difference cannot be ignored in
studying behavior relevant to law. Without explaining the sense of
obligation, a theory cannot explain the law. Norms arise in a game
when the game creates, or evokes, a sense of obligation in the
players concerning the strategies that they follow. I develop a
predictive theory of "normative equilibria" in Part II by adapting
some philosophical concepts to evolutionary game theory.
II. GAMES AND NORMS
Social norms can be regarded as a "public good" subject to the
usual corrosive logic of the prisoner's dilemma. Members of a
community collectively gain if they all adhere to the norms, but
members individually gain if they violate them; therefore, the norms
tend to unravel.46 Reality, however, does not conform to this
pessimistic prediction. In fact, many social norms arise and persist
without enforcement by the state. I try to explain these facts in this
Section of the Article.
A. Agency Game
I develop the "agency game" depicted in Figure 1 as the
paradigm for cooperation in business. In the agency game, the first
player to move, who is called the principal, decides whether or not
to make an investment of 1. If no investment is made, the game
ends, and the players receive nothing. If an investment is made, the
second player, who is called the agent, decides whether to cooperate
or appropriate. Appropriation is merely redistributive: the agent
appropriates the principal's investment of 1. Consequently, the sum
of the payoffs in the northeast cell of Figure 1 equals 0. Coopera-
tion by both players is productive: the investment of 1 grows to 2.
Consequently, the sum of the payoffs in the northwest cell of Figure
1 equals 1. When the agent cooperates, the principal recovers his
investment and the players split the product (each player receives
a profit of 0.5).
46 See MARY T. DOUcLAS, How INSTrTUTIONS THINK 9-30 (1986).
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FIGURE 1: Agency Game
Agent
cooperate appropriate
invest 0.5 1.0
Principal 0.5 1 -1.0------ -- -----------------------------
don't invest 0 0
0 0
In each cell, the northeast number refers to the agent's payoff, and the
southwest number refers to the principal's payoff.
If the agency game is played only once, the agent's best move is
to appropriate. Knowing this, the principal's best move is not to
invest. The one-shot game of investment has a unique solution,
which is unproductive.
An enforceable contract can overcome this inefficiency by
changing the agent's incentives. For example, recovery of expecta-
tion damages gives the principal an incentive to invest regardless of
the probability of breach by the agent. Similarly, the costless
collection of expectation damages from the agent gives him a strong
incentive to perform. Enforcement of contracts, however, typically
requires coercion by a third party such as the state. At this point,
I want to analyze cooperation without state protection, so I turn to
other solutions to the agency problem.
B. Enduring Relationships
Investment in a business network often occurs among people
with enduring relationships, rather than as a one-shot transaction.
To capture this possibility, assume that the agency game depicted
in Figure 1 is repeated indefinitely, thus transforming a one-shot
game into a super game. In any round of the super game in which
the principal invests, the agent enjoys an immediate advantage from
appropriating. A successful strategy for preventing such opportu-
nistic behavior, called "tit-for-tat," 47 occurs when the principal
responds in the next round by refusing to invest, but begins
investing again in a subsequent round. The experience of immedi-
47 See ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EvOLUTION OF COOPERATION 13-14 (1984).
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ate punishment usually suffices to stop opportunistic behavior by
the agent and restores cooperation.
The problem of opportunistic behavior is solvable in many
repeated games when players commit to an enduring relationship-
provided that they can observe each others' moves and they do not
discount the future too heavily.41 (The exceptions to this general-
ization need not concern us here.4 ) Enduring relationships can be
based upon kinship, friendship, ethnicity, or religion, to name a
few. Instead of analyzing the anthropology of business, however, I
turn to another solution for the agency problem.
C. Tentative Relationships
Many relationships in a business network dissolve and reform
easily. To model tentative relationships, assume as before that the
agency game is repeated indefinitely. Change the assumption,
however, that there are only two players. Instead, assume that there
are an infinite number of players, who form into pairs to play each
round of the game. At the end of each round, some of these
partnerships continue into the next round, and others dissolve.
When a partnership dissolves, the players must find new partners
for the next round of the game by a random draw from the pool of
available players.
Partnerships dissolve in two ways. First, the principal exits after
an agent appropriates. Second, an unpredictable change in business
48 Maskin and Fudenberg have proven that in any game in which (i) play-
ers maximize the discounted sum of single-period utilities, (ii) the discount rate is
not too high, and (iii) the players can observe the past history of moves in the game,
any pair of payoffs which Pareto dominate the minimax can arise as average-
equilibrium payoffs of the repeated game. See Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The
Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, 54
ECONOMETRICA 533, 533-36 (1986). Thus, repetition of the game makes a Pareto
improvement possible. See id. This theorem, however, still leaves unexplained why
the probability of a Pareto efficient solution is as high as empirical studies suggest it
to be.
49 See especially the "weakest link in the chain" game, discussed by Glenn W.
Harrison & Jack Hirshleifer, An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot
Models of Public Goods, 97J. POL. ECON. 201, 221-22 (1989), and Jack Hirshleifer &
Juan C.M. Coll, What Strategies Can Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation?,
32J. CONFLICT RESOL. 367,394-98 (1988). See also Terry L. Anderson & PJ. Hill, The
Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18J.L. & ECON. 163, 178-79
(1975) (arguing that "the evolution of property rights is a function of the marginal
decision making process"). See generally Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Law
and Economics, RS. L. & ECON. 1, 50-52 (1982) (arguing that cooperative behavior
largely depends upon the ecological situation).
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conditions makes the relationship unproductive, so both partners
agree to end it. If neither party ends the partnership, it continues
into the next round of the game.
The equilibrium concept for this kind of game draws upon
evolutionary theory.5" Think of the "players" as hosts for compet-
ing behaviors and ask which of these behaviors will survive in
competition with the others. Selection favors the behavior that
enjoys a higher return. To model this fact, assume that the
proportion of players using a particular strategy increases as long as
it enjoys an above-average return. Conversely, the proportion of
players using a particular strategy decreases as long as it suffers
below-average returns. Competition tends to eliminate all below-
average strategies, so that every strategy surviving in equilibrium
earns the same rate of return.
When a payoff matrix, like the one depicted in Figure 1, is
embedded in an evolutionary model, a familiar result to theorists is
a mixed equilibrium in which most agents cooperate and some
agents appropriate.5 1 To see why this result occurs, consider the
fact that cooperators form stable relationships, whereas non-
cooperating agents only play once with any particular principal.52
Consequently, the agent who follows the pure strategy of coopera-
tion expects to enjoy a modest payoff in a high proportion of
rounds, whereas the agent who follows the pure strategy of
noncooperation expects to enjoy a high payoff in a low proportion
of rounds. In a mixed equilibrium, these two strategies have the
same expected value.
'o For an excellent review of evolution as applied to game theory, see
Abhijit Bannerjee & Jorgen W. Weibull, Evolution and Rationality: Some Recent
Game-Theoretic Results, Research Papers in Economics (Dep't of Econ., Univ. of
Stockholm, 1993). For a discussion of the relationship between law and evolutionary
theory, see E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition inJurisprudence, 85 COLUM.
L. REv. 38, 38-40 (1985); E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory
Evolution: The Federalization ofEnvironmental Law, 1J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 313,
314-17 (1985). For a pioneering article on evolutionary models of law, see
Hirshleifer, supra note 49. For a pioneering book on evolutionary models of
economics, see RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982).
51 See Rudolf Schussler, Anonymous Exchange Cooperation, Paper Presented at
the 4th International Conference on Social Justice Research (July 1993).
512 For this formulation, see id.; Robyn Dawes & John Orbell, Social Welfare,
Cooperators' Advantages, and the Option of Not Playing the Came, Paper Presented
at the 4th International Conference on Social Justice Research (July 1993).
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D. What Is a Norm?
I have shown that relationships can solve the agency game
through tit-for-tat or exit. In communities of people, however, such
games usually generate norms. Before developing a theory of
norms, I explain what they are. The question, "What is a norm?,"
is even more general than the question "What is a law?" These
questions have been addressed by moral philosophers over many
generations. Rather than reviewing the answers, I distill some
conclusions relevant to behavioral theories.
Norms are practical in the sense that they direct behavior. To
direct behavior effectively, a speaker ought to say who must do what
and when. A complete norm provides these instructions explicitly.
Thus the canonical form of a norm, according to one formula-
tion,15 states that each member of a certain class of people (norm's
subjects) has an obligation (norm's character) to do something
(norm's act) in certain circumstances (norm's conditions), subject to
a penalty for noncompliance (norm's sanction). For example,
drivers ought to remain within the posted speed limit in all
circumstances or pay a fine.
The fact that a law was enacted provides a reason for citizens to
do what it requires. Similarly, the fact that a norm was internalized
provides a reason for the decisionmaker to do what it requires. To
illustrate, suppose that I initially regard the decision to smoke as a
purely personal preference, in which the individual should weigh
immediate pleasure against future harm to his health. Someone
subsequently convinces me, contrary to my previous beliefs, that
smoking is morally wrong ("God forbids us to harm ourselves for
pleasure's sake," "You risk orphaning your child," etc.). After my
conversion, I have an additional reason for not smoking; smoking
violates a moral rule that I now hold.
Psychologists have extensively researched the internalization of
norms. Stages in the development of moral reasoning among
children have been studied, notably by Piaget and Kohlberg.
5 4
" Here I follow the account of the "kernel" of a norm in VON WRICHT, supra note
44, at 70-92. Other elements could be added to the canonical form of a norm,
including the enforcer of the norm and whether the enforcer is permitted or
obligated to enforce it.
' Piaget presented his ideas about stages in mental development in a series of
books in French beginning in 1937, including the English translation JEAN PIAGET,
THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 13-108 (Marjorie Cabain trans., 1965).
Kohlberg also developed his ideas in a series of books and articles over many years;
see especially Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages
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According to their theories, a child perfects the ability to internalize
norms as she acquires a capacity for general reasoning. Their
research, like my characterization of internalization as acceptance
of a new reason for acting, makes the process sound cool and
rational. In contrast, "depth psychology" often traces the internal-
ization of morality to irrational processes that are hot and inchoate.
According to these theories, internalization of morality ingrains new
impulses in a child through emotional experiences. An example is
Freud's theory that morality is the "ghost in the nursery," meaning
the repressed memory of parental punishments. 55 Repression
transmutes fear into guilt, which changes behavior.
Both types of internalization-accepting a new reason and
ingraining a new impulse-create a new motive, which can tip the
individual's motivational balance. Economic models often view
motivation as a calculus of psychological benefits and costs.5"
From this perspective, internalization attaches a "guilt penalty" to
violating a norm, which can change the sign of the net psychological
benefits. 7 To illustrate, consider how the payoffs in Figure 1
might change if the agent internalizes a norm forbidding the
appropriation of the principal's investment.5 " In Figure 2, the
and the Idea ofJustice, in 1 ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT 1,409-12 (1981), in which
the appendix outlines his account of the six stages of moral development. Flaws in
Kohlberg's approach have generated much criticism from feminists, notably CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT 18-23 (1982). See also Nona P. Lyons, Two Perspectives.: On Self,
Relationships, and Morality, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN 21 (Carol Gilligan et al.
eds., 1988)
" In Freud's account, morality is the repressed memory of punishment
and threats from a child's father. In technical terms, the super-ego emerges when a
child represses his Oedipal fears and identifies with his father. See SIGMUND FREUD,
THE EGO AND THE ID 18-29 (James Strachey ed. &Joan Riviere trans., W.W. Norton
& Co. 1960). A clear explanation is in RICHARD WOLLHEIM, FREUD 177-218 (1971).
' Antiutilitarian philosophers typically reject the theory that conforming to a
principle of morality involves weighing alternative reasons and balancing them. For
example, see the account of "exclusionary reasons" inJOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM 267-87 (1986).
-1 On the use of a "guilt penalty" to change the payoff matrix in a game, see MARK
CASSON, THE ECONOMICS OF BUSINESS CULTURE: GAME THEORY, TRANSACTION
COSTS, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 29-52 (1991).
" The following is a rare example of a discussion of internalization by a law-and-
economics scholar:
[A] player who had been punished in tit-for-tat fashion x-times in succession
for unprovoked defections in a Prisoner's Dilemma game would, at that
point, internalize the punishment. After internalization, the player would,
like Pavlov's dog, automatically deduct the expected amount ofpunishment
THE NEW LAW MERCHANT
agent enjoys a payoff of I from appropriating. After internalizing
the norm, however, the agent might experience a cost of 0.7 from
violating it. After internalization, the net payoff from appropriating
now equals 0.3. Cooperation is the dominant strategy for both
players in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2: Internalization and Agency Game
Agent
cooperate appropriate
invest
Principal
don't invest
In each cell, the northeast number refers to the agent's payoff, and the
southwest number refers to the principal's payoff.
Figure 2 depicts how internalization can tip the motivational
balance of a decisionmaker who maximizes his net benefits. Some
moral theorists, especially those in the tradition of Kant, object to
the characterization of motivation in terms of benefits and costs.
The precise account of how internalization can tip the motivational
balance, however, does not matter for purposes of this Article.
Instead of analyzing moral motivations, however, I want to
describe an important connection between morality and business.
Max Weber argued that the emergence of capitalism depended
upon an ethic, first perfected among Protestant Christians, in which
the individual internalized an occupational role.59 "Internaliza-
tion" here means accepting the norms of an occupation so inti-
mately that they become part of the individual's self-conception,
thus altering his perceived self-interest. Internalization of an
occupational role, according to Weber, increases the dedication and
creativity with which individuals pursue business goals.
from the payoffs he previously perceived to be associated with his
unprovoked defections.
Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique
of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 46 (1989).
59 See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPIrAISM 27
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1958).
0.5 0.3
0.5 -1.0
----------------------
0, 0
0 I0±
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Similarly, Durkheim asked how a modern society can divide
labor so finely and still hold itself together.' He found the answer
in the internalization of occupational roles. Occupational roles
combine technical skill and social norms. According to Durkheim,
complimentary roles coordinate the work of strangers and allow
them to develop specialized skills that result in a high level of
efficiency.
61
By dispensing with the need for state enforcement, internaliza-
tion of norms is the ultimate decentralization of law. Consequently,
the internalization of occupational roles is critical to decentralizing
economic law. This view has been revived by Casson in a recent
book applying game theory to business practice. 62  Modelling
business norms can give new vitality to an old vision of what makes
capitalism possible.
E. Existence
How can an observer tell whether a norm or law exists in a
community of people? According to the positive theory of law,6
a norm or law exists in a community when it achieves a minimum
level of effectiveness in directing behavior. Otherwise, the commu-
nity does not have the norm or law in question. This conclusion
provides a building block in the theory of norms and games. The
many refinements and criticisms of the positivist theory of norms
need not concern us.
64
60 See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 68-87 (W.D. Halls
trans., 1984).
61 See id.
62 Casson states:
This book has a simple point to make. Overall economic performance
depends on transaction costs, and these mainly reflect the level of trust in
the economy. The level of trust depends in turn on culture. An effective
culture has a strong moral content. Morality can overcome problems that
formal procedures-based on monitoring compliance with contracts-cannot.
A strong culture therefore reduces transaction costs and enhances
performance-the success of an economy depends on the quality of its
culture.
CASSON, supra note 57, at 3.
' A summary of the positive theory of law is in DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 14-22.
" This theory is vulnerable to the criticism that a norm might satisfy the positivist
existence conditions in one community, whereas people in other communities regard
it as thoroughly immoral. To illustrate, many tribes impose an obligation on their
members to revenge the death of a relative, even though clan revenge seems
abhorrent to most modern people. Thus, critics have argued that a rule must satisfy
certain minimal conditions of morality before it can be called a law, regardless of
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The requirements for the effectiveness of social norms are
different than for state laws. As explained, someone who has
internalized a norm feels guilt from violating it and pride from
obeying it.65 Consequently, internalization may tip the balance for
a decisionmaker in favor of obeying a norm. In addition, norms are
necessarily general in their application. It follows that someone
who has internalized a norm feels that others ought to obey it as
well and, therefore, tends to criticize or punish people who violate
it. The threat of criticism and punishment deters some people
from violating a norm. Consequently, when a significant propor-
tion of people in a community internalize a norm, it becomes
effective in directing behavior. Thus, a social norm or custom exists
in a community when enough people internalize it to make it
effective.
This analysis suggests a prescription for the empirical investiga-
tion of customary norms. First, formulate the hypothesis that a
norm exists. To do so, state the norm in canonical form and
describe the community in which it allegedly exists. Second, to test
whether the hypothesis is true or false, collect information from the
community concerning the internalization of the norm. The
hypothesis that a customary norm exists in a community is true if a
sufficient number of its members internalize the norm.
State law is different from social norms in an important respect.
As explained, a social norm is ineffective in a community and does
not exist unless people internalize it. Similarly, if citizens internal-
ize state laws, then states laws are effective. State law can be
effective, however, without its internalization by the citizens. Earlier
I mentioned the fact that the state has rules for making rules.6
(The secondary rules prescribe how to make the primary rules.)
When making a rule, the state attaches sanctions to obligations, and
officials must apply the sanctions to rule-breakers. If official
whether or not it satisfies positivist existence conditions. For one of the grand,
eloquent debates in jurisprudence concerning this subject, see LON L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW (2d ed. 1964); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply
to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV. 593 (1958).
' These feelings manifest themselves in various behaviors that signal to others
what the actor did and change the optimal strategies in games. For example, a
person may prefer to cooperate in a game because involuntary emotional responses
increase the risk of detection for "cheaters." For an account of emotional responses
as signals, see ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE
OF THE EMOTIONS 1-19, 43-70 (1988).
' See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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sanctions are effective, state law may control behavior, even though
citizens do not internalize the law. For example, the intermittent
enforcement of a speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour may slow
the traffic down to sixty-five miles per hour, in which case behavior
is controlled by a law that few people internalize and obey.
67
F. Emergence
Having discussed how individuals internalize norms, I turn to
the question of how norms arise in a business community. Recall
the agency game in which the principal gives the agent control over
an asset. More cooperation increases the level of trust, which
increases the expected value of the game to all of the players.
Consequently, everyone enjoys a positive externality when more
agents cooperate and fewer agents appropriate. Conversely, all
players suffer a negative externality when more players appro-
priate.68
The principal will invest if he thinks that his agent is a coopera-
tor, whereas he will not invest if he thinks that his agent is an
appropriator. The players in games often provide signals concern-
ing the strategies that they follow. In the agency game, every agent
has an incentive to provide signals that induce principals to invest.
Every agent will signal "cooperation," regardless of whether his real
strategy is cooperation or appropriation. Consequently, a consensus
will arise in the community about how agents ought to act. Such a
consensus will convince some members of the community to
internalize the norm and to ingrain it in the young. Thus a new
norm will emerge in the community.
69
67 This example is especially interesting because, while almost everyone disobeys
the law, most people may still believe that it is the best law to have. For example, it
may be better to set the speed limit at "55" so people drive at "65" than to have the
law say "65" so people drive "75."
' Cooperators also create a negative externality by soaking up the pool of
available business partners, whereas appropriators increase the pool because their
partnerships dissolve quickly. Cooperation thus produces a positive externality and
a negative externality, and I implicitly assume that the former is larger than the latter.
69 Arguing along similar lines, Pettit says that norms will be "resilient" when nearly
everyone approves of those that benefit others and disapproves of those that harm
others. See Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 ETHIcs
725, 753-55 (1990).
For a similar account of the emergence of norms, expressed in the language of
philosophy, see Allan Gibbard, Norms, Discussion, and Ritual: EvolutionayPuzzles, 100
ETHICs 787, 799-802 (1990). Gibbard states:
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G. Marginal Cooperator
How does the emergence of a business norm affect the equili-
brium level of investment and production? I will demonstrate that
individuals typically change the equilibrium by punishing violators
of the norm, but not by obeying it themselves.
In the agency game, people who internalize the norm will
cooperate, not appropriate, even if the objective payoff for
cooperating is slightly lower than for appropriating. I call this
behavior "principled" conformity to the norm. In contrast, people
who do not internalize the norm will cooperate only if the objective
payoff for cooperation is at least as high as for appropriation. I call
this "adventitious" conformity to the norm.
In a mixed equilibrium, some players pursue the strategy of
cooperation, and others pursue the strategy of appropriation. In an
evolutionary equilibrium, all strategies that persist yield the same
objective payoff. When all strategies yield the same payoff, some
people conform to the norm adventitiously. Equilibrium is reached
by adjusting the number of people who conform adventitiously to
the norm. Consequently, the presence of people who conform from
principle does not affect the equilibrium.
For example, assume the rate of return for players in the agency
game equalizes when eighty players cooperate and twenty players
appropriate. Furthermore, assume that sixty players cooperate from
principle and that twenty players cooperate adventitiously. Now
assume that one of the appropriators is convinced to change his evil
ways and start cooperating. The change in his behavior causes a dis-
equilibrium in which eighty-one players cooperate and nineteen
players appropriate. Equilibrium will be restored by one of the
My hypothesis is this: There is a special kind of psychic state, accepting
a norm, that serves to coordinate actions through discussion. How might
this work? Think of a norm simply as an imperative saying what to do in
some kind of situation, or how to feel .... One needed characteristic is a tie
to action: a person who accepts a norm tends to abide by it when he
encounters a situation to which it applies. I call this normative governance.
Other motivations may overcome this tendency, but the tendency, I
speculate, has some force nevertheless. A second needed characteristic is
responsiveness to discussion, a kind of responsiveness that will lead to
consensus. I hypothesize two kinds of responsiveness. One is sheer
influenceability: in normative discussion, a person will avow norms. Others
exposed to these normative avowals will tend to accept the norms avowed.
A second kind of responsiveness is to demands for consistency; this limits
one's ability to tailor the norms one avows to one's own case.
Id. at 791.
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adventitious cooperators changing his strategy from cooperation to
appropriation. Thus, the internalization of the norm by one more
player changes the identity of the cooperators, but not their
number.
Marginal players change their behavior when objective payoffs
change by a small amount, whereas inframarginal players persist in
their current behavior. The argument in this Section can be
summarized by stating that adventitious conformity is marginal and
principled conformity is inframarginal in a mixed evolutionary equi-
librium. A change in the number of inframarginal players does not
change the equilibrium, which is determined by marginal players.
H. Cheap Pain
I will now explain how the emergence of a norm changes the
equilibrium levels of production and investment. A person who
internalizes a norm may be willing to devote modest amounts of his
resources to enforcing it for the benefit of others. Informal
sanctions like gossip and ostracism are cheap pain.7 0  These
"0 In discussing the problem of sanctioning wrongdoers by gossip, Pettit writes:
But people do not have to identify violators intentionally; theyjust have to
be around in sufficient numbers to make it likely that violators will be
noticed. And equally, people do not have to discipline violators intention-
ally, going out of their way for example to rebuke them or report them to
others; they just have to disapprove of them-or at least be assumed to
disapprove of them-whether that attitude ever issues in intentional activity.
Pettit, supra note 69, at 739 (citation omitted).
Pettit's argument is based on the motivation assumption that people are moved
by a concern that others not think badly of them. For a more pessimistic assessment
of informal sanctions, see Douglas D. Heckathorn, Collective Action and the Second-
Order Free-Rider Problem, 1 RATIONALITY & Soc'y 78, 80-81 (1989). For a discussion
of how overenforcement might arise from the interdependence of enforcement
actions by private property owners, see David de Meza & J.R. Could, The Social
Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights, 100J. POL. ECON. 561, 561-63
(1992). For an argument that markets will generate new technologies for enforcing
property rights, see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347 (1967). For theories of ostracism, see OSTRACISM: A SOCIAL AND
BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON (Margaret Gruter & Roger D. Masters eds., 1986).
Consider this instructive example of the use of reputation to achieve a policy
goal at the EPA during the Bush administration. Having identified the Monsanto
Corporation as the worst chemical polluter in the nation, the director of the EPA got
the director of Monsanto to pledge major reductions in emissions to avoid bad
publicity and possible legislation. The EPA then used "logrolling" to get other firms
to match the percentage reductions by Monsanto. This program of voluntary
compliance was highly successful with larger firms, but not with smaller firms. See
Personal Communication with E. Donald Elliott, General Counsel of the EPA.
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sanctions increase the expected cost of violating the norm, which
increases conformity to it. Thus, the emergence of a business norm
increases cooperation by deterring agents from appropriating.
I will illustrate this point through use of the agency game.
Immediate self-interest provides sufficient reason for principals to
exit from relations with appropriating agents. Enforcement,
however, often goes beyond the narrow self-interest of the enforcer.
The possibility of principled enforcement can be captured in the
agency game by introducing reputation.
Assume that partnership is selective, not random, and that
selection is based upon the reputation of a potential partner.
Someone's reputation consists of information about his past
behavior that disseminates among other players. Thus, the benefits
of accurate reputation diffuse among the players of the game.
While benefits diffuse, the costs of disseminating information
about the reputation of others falls upon the disseminator. People
who have internalized the norm are prepared to bear the modest
costs of enforcing it for the benefit of others. Consequently, the
internalization of norms promotes the dissemination of information
about wrongdoers. In technical terms, internalization of norms
overcomes the tendency to "free ride" on the enforcement efforts
of others.
I. Dynamics
I have explained that people who internalize a norm increase the
equilibrium level of cooperation by punishing appropriators. I will
develop this argument in a dynamic setting.
People who internalize a norm will, presumably, pay something
to enforce it. As the cost of enforcing the norm increases, however,
fewer people are willing to pay the higher costs. This situation is
depicted in Figure 3. According to Figure 3, eighty percent of the
population has internalized the norm, and twenty percent has
externalized it. The function E(c) slopes down to indicate the
decline in enforcers E from eighty percent as the cost of enforcing
c increases.
7 1
71 Here is a strict definition of terms, using the density function f(s) over
willingness-to-pay to enforce the social norm:
E = - ff(s)
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FIGURE 3: Proportion of Enforcers
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Figure 3 depicts how much individuals are willing to pay to
enforce a norm. Now consider the amount that enforcement
actually costs. The informal punishments that people use to enforce
norms include criticism, shunning, and force. To illustrate, people
who break rules of social etiquette may experience gossip, ostra-
cism, and vandalism. Similarly, people who break the norms of a
profession may suffer loss of reputation, expulsion, or predatory
competition. The person who spontaneously punishes someone in
these ways usually runs some risk of confrontation or revenge, as
well as any direct monetary costs. The risk of confrontation and
revenge, however, tends to fall as the proportion of people willing
to act as punishers increases. In other words, the enforcer's cost of
punishing decreases as the proportion of enforcers increases.
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Thus informal enforcement, like state enforcement, enjoys increas-
ing returns to scale.
These facts are depicted in Figure 4, which graphs the relation-
ship between the cost of punishing someone who breaks a social
norm and the proportion of people willing to bear that cost. As the
proportion of enforcers E rises towards the maximum possible value
1, the cost of enforcement falls to its minimum value c. Conversely,
' Peter Huang constructs a similar model in which people are more inclined to
do their duty when others do theirs. See Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional
Responses in Litigation, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 31 (1992).
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as the proportion of enforcers E falls toward 0, the cost of enforce-
ment rises to its maximum level -. So, the cost of enforcement rises
at an indefinite rate from c to - as the number of enforcers falls (the
curve need not be perfectly smooth as depicted in Figure 4).
FIGuRE 4: Enforcement Costs
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Now let us compare the two preceding figures. Figure 3 takes
the cost of enforcement as given and depicts how many people
actually enforce the norm. Figure 4 depicts how many enforcers are
required to sustain a given cost of enforcement. If the actual
number of enforcers equals the number required to sustain the
current cost of enforcement, then the cost of enforcement remains
constant. In other words, an intersection of the curves graphed in
Figures 3 and 4 indicates an equilibrium in the number of enforcers
and the cost of enforcement.
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Graphing several different equilibria helps to explain some
actual cases observed in social life. I begin with the common
situation discussed in preceding sections, in which some proportion
of the people who internalize the norm enforce it on others. In
Figure 5, an equilibrium occurs where the two curves intersect at
(E*, c*). The dynamic behavior of the system is easily explained.
"To be precise, an equilibrium is a pair of values (E*, c*) such that E* = E(c*)
and c* = c(E*).
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If the actual number of enforcers exceeds the number required to
sustain the current cost of enforcement, then the cost of enforce-
ment will fall. This situation occurs in Figure 5 for values of the
variables less than (E*, c*). The directional arrows in Figure 5
indicate the direction of change. Conversely, if the actual number
of enforcers falls short of the number required to sustain the
current cost of enforcement, then the cost of enforcement will rise.
This situation occurs in Figure 5 for values of the variables greater
than (E*, c*), as indicated by the directional arrow. Notice that the
directional arrows in Figure 5 point toward the intersection of the
two curves at (E*, c*), indicating that this equilibrium is stable.
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FiCuRn 5: Stable Equilibrium
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Now I turn to another case with two extreme possibilities:
Either everyone who internalizes the norm enforces it, or else no
one enforces it. 75 This situation occurs in an internal equilibrium
as depicted in Figure 6. In Figure 6, for values of the variables
4 The stability conditions are as follows: If E(c) cuts c(E) from below, then the
equilibrium is stable. If E(c) cuts c(E) from above, then the equilibrium is unstable.
' This possibility is discussed by Taylor, who writes: "Cooperation may still be
rational... provided that there are some players who Cooperate conditionally on the
Cooperation of all the other Cooperators, both conditional and unconditional, and
that all the Cooperators' discount rates are not too great." TAYLOR, POSSIBILITY,
supra note 9, at 104. Similarly, Casson writes: "If the leader can just 'prime the
pump' by getting a few more people to be honest, then learning effects will increase
optimism and cause a further improvement in integrity ... " CASSON, supra note 57,
at 83.
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exceeding (E*, c*), the actual number of enforcers exceeds the
number required to sustain the current cost of enforcement. The
cost of enforcement therefore falls, as indicated by the directional
arrow pointing away from (E*, c*). Similarly, for values of the
variables falling short of (E*, c*), the actual number of enforcers
falls short of the number required to sustain the current cost of
enforcement, so the cost of enforcement rises. The directional
arrow pointing away from (E*, c*) indicates this fact. According to
the directional arrows in Figure 6, any slight movement away from
the unstable equilibrium at (E*, c*) will send the system to the
upper corner, denoted (0.8, c), or to the lower corner, denoted (0,
Z). In the upper corner, everyone who internalizes the norm
enforces it, and in the lower corner no one enforces the norm.
FIGURE 6: Unstable Equilibrium
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Figure 6 depicts a social norm that can only exist at a high level
of enforcement. (E*, c*) is the tipping point. If the system begins
above the tipping point, it "tips in" to a high level of enforcement
of the norm. Conversely, if the system begins below the tipping
point, it "tips out" and the norm disappears. Many variations of this
theme are possible by modifying the shapes of the curves. For
example, in Figure 7 most people enforce the norm, unless
enforcement falls below the tipping value, in which case few people
enforce it. The instability occurs when (i) a small increase in the
number of enforcers causes a large decrease in the cost of enforce-
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ment76 and (ii) a small decrease in the price of enforcement causes
a large increase in the number of enforcers.7
FIGURE 7: Most Conform or Few Conform
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If the system has "tipped out," a policy that causes the system to
"tip in" can dramatically increase conformity to the norm. This fact
can provide a justification for Durkheim's expressive theory of the
state. 7  This theory asserts that the state should express the
commitment of society to fundamental values by recognizing them
in law. State enactment, without formal enforcement, can some-
times tip the social system into conformity with the law by causing
citizens to believe correctly that more of them will enforce the
norm.
To illustrate such a self-fulfilling prophesy, many states have
enacted ordinances prohibiting smoking in public buildings such as
airports. Officials almost never enforce these rules. The posting of
the ordinances, however, apparently causes citizens to enforce the
rules against violators. Knowing this, most smokers conform to the
rules. In terms of the preceding figures, enactment of the anti-
"6 In other words, the cost of enforcement is highly elastic with respect to the
number of enforcers.
" In other words, the number of enforcers is highly elastic with respect to the cost
of enforcement.
8 An insightful account of Durkheim's theory is in DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT
AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 23-46 (1990).
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smoking ordinance lowered the perceived cost of confrontation in
complaining to smokers, which shifted c(E) down and caused the
system to tip into a new equilibrium with a high level of conform-
ity.
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A personal anecdote provides another example. The city of
Berkeley recently enacted an ordinance requiring owners to clean
up after their dogs (the "pooper-scooper" law). Enactment of the
law clarified vague social norms concerning courtesy. After the
law's passage, people became more aggressive about enforcing what
common courtesy demands. Apparently it is easier to say, "Obey
the law," than to say, "Don't be so rude." The ordinance tipped the
balance in favor of private enforcement of the norm and changed
the behavior of dog owners.
In these two examples, the law solves the problem it addresses
without formal enforcement. In other cases, however, state
enforcement may be required to tip the balance toward conforming
to a social norm. The possibility of state enforcement provides a
credible threat to citizens who complain about the violation of social
norms. The threat is credible insofar as the state will enforce its
laws against those who violate them.
J. Bargaining Game
I have shown that people who internalize a business norm cause
more cooperation in a community, not by obeying the norm
themselves, but by punishing others who violate it. This conclusion
follows from the fact that the people who internalize the norm are
inframarginal with respect to conformity and marginal with respect
to enforcement. Now I turn from norms of cooperation to norms
of distribution.
In the agency game characterized by Figure 1, cooperation by
both players creates a valuable product. An equal division of the
product was prescribed by assumption in Figure 1.8" In business,
however, the parties usually bargain over shares of a cooperative
product which involves a problem of distribution. Now I want to
" For a fascinating collection of studies on public policy toward smoking, see
ROBERT L. RABIN & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLICS, AND
CULTuRE (1993).
o Strictly speaking, the payoff matrix stipulates an equal division of the surplus
from cooperation in each round of the game. Even without side payments, however,
a player who wants a larger share can insist on appropriating rather than cooperating
in some proportion of rounds.
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explain the obstacle to the emergence of norms of distribution. I
will superimpose a bargaining game upon the agency game.
In the agency game, the parties can make a cooperative product
of 1, but they must first agree on how to divide it. Assume the
parties bargain for a finite amount of time over the agent's share of
the cooperative product, denoted b, where 0 < b < 1. If the parties
agree before time expires, the cooperative payoffs equal ((1-b), b).
If time expires without an agreement, the game ends with payoffs
(0, 0). If a bargain is struck, the principal promises to invest and
the agent promises to cooperate, and both players agree on their
shares of the product.
Soft bargaining is a public good in the sense that everyone
enjoys a positive externality when other players bargain soft. The
positive externality manifests in a higher probability of cooperation
and a larger expected share of its benefits. Conversely, hard
bargaining is a public bad in the sense that everyone suffers a
negative externality when other players bargain hard. In spite of
this fact, a business community is unlikely to develop a norm
requiring soft bargaining. No such norm can emerge because of the
incentives to signal, as I explain.
An evolutionary equilibrium in the bargaining game typically has
a mixed solution, with some players bargaining hard and others
bargaining soft. To drive a hard bargain, a player must signal that
he is a hard bargainer. People who represent themselves as hard
bargainers are likely to defend hard bargaining in principle. Even
soft bargainers may gain an advantage by representing themselves
as hard bargainers. Consequently, many people will signal that they
follow a hard-bargaining strategy. Given this fact, no consensus will
emerge that people ought to bargain soft. Instead of a ccnsensus,
a mixture of opinions about the ethics of bargaining will mirror the
mixture of equilibrium strategies actually followed.
Notice that incentives for signaling are the opposite in the
agency game and bargaining game. In the agency game, players
represent themselves as cooperators, and cooperation is a public
good. In the bargaining game, many players represent themselves
as hard bargainers, and hard bargaining is a public bad. My theory
predicts that community norms will emerge when signaling and
public goods converge, whereas divergence between them will yield
a stew of public opinion. Thus, my theory predicts the emergence
of business norms approving of cooperation and disapproving of
appropriation. My theory predicts, however, that no norm will
emerge disapproving of hard bargaining.
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These predictions seem broadly consistent with the facts. In
general, business communities do not seem to develop substantive
rules stipulating fair prices. "Fair prices," such as an interest rate
ceiling, have usually been imposed upon businesses. Instead,
bargaining norms tend to be procedural. For many procedures,
public representation converges with the public interest. For
example, everyone has an incentive to denounce fraud, including
the people who practice it. Consequently, my theory predicts that
a business community will have norms prohibiting fraud, but no
norm prohibiting hard bargaining.
Ill. STRUCTURAL ADJUDICATION
This Part applies the theory of norms and games to the role of
the state in decentralized lawmaking. In democracies, coercive laws
are typically justified by the principle of majority rule. The
justification for enforcing social norms, however, is quite different.
Social norms are selectively enforced by judges in common law
countries. I call this "structural adjudication" by judges. In the
remainder of the Article, I develop a theory of the social structures
that should guide adjudication.
A. Serendipity
According to the utilitarian tradition, people typically feel
obligated to do what is socially efficient and to avoid doing what
is socially inefficient."1 In so far as this generalization is true,
the efficient equilibria in a game will become norms and the
inefficient equilibria will not even persist as regularities. Accord-
ing to recent empirical research in sociology, games tend to settle
into equilibria that satisfy the sense of fairness among the play-
ers. 2 Combining these two predictions leads to the conclusion
that perceived fairness and efficiency are necessary and sufficient
for the evolution of a social norm. Structural adjudication begins
81 See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 13 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (discussing
utilitarian theory). For a modern utilitarian theory of social norms, see ROBERT
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 123-264
(1991).
2 For a review of this research, see generally Robert B. Chaldini, Carl A. Kallgren
& Raymond R. Reno, A Focus Thoery of Normative Conduct: A Theoretical Refinement
and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in Human Behavior, in 24 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 201 (M.P. Hanna ed., 1991).
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with the observation that business communities generate norms to
encourage cooperation and discourage appropriation. The benefits
of these norms diffuse throughout the community, so individuals
tend to free ride on the enforcement efforts of others. Intern-
alization of norms partially overcomes the problem of under-
enforcement. Enforcement by the state can sometimes improve the
situation still further.8  In these conditions, enforcement of
social norms is fair by the norms of the community to which they
apply and efficient by the standards of economics. Fairness and
efficiency are strong justifications for the state to enforce a social
norm.
If the serendipity of utilitarianism characterized social life, the
adjudication of social norms would be easy. In fact, social norms
sometimes fail to emerge when needed, or they emerge when not
needed for fairness or efficiency. I explore some "community
failures" in the remainder of this Article.
B. Formalization and Information
State enforcement does not always improve the efficiency of
a social norm. State enforcement requires formalization. Revis-
ing or repealing formal law usually requires adjudication or
a collective decision. In contrast, changing customs requires
individuals to behave differently, without adjudication or a collec-
tive decision. Consequently, social norms can be flexible. For
this reason, excessive or premature formalization of a law is
inefficient.
The flexibility of judges depends upon their information. To
illustrate, consider the difference between the cost-benefit approach
to adjudication and the structural approach as exemplified by the
contrast between Judge Hand's decision in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co. 4 and Judge Posner's decision in Rodi Yachts, Inc. v.
National Marine, Inc. 5 In both cases, a barge broke loose from its
moorings and caused subsequent collision damage to other vessels.
In the former case, Judge Hand could find no community standard
applicable to the bargee, so he applied his own cost-benefit test, as
s' Notice that this account corresponds to Locke's thesis that rights exist in nature,
but the state is needed to remove vagueness and provide adequate enforcement. See
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CvL GOVERNMENT 16-29 (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., 1952) (1690).
" 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
9 984 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1993).
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embodied in the "Hand Rule.""6 According to this rule, a defen-
dant's untaken precaution is negligent if the burden of precaution
is less than the expected savings in liability ("B < PL"). This
mathematical formulation, which made the case into the all-time
favorite of economists, was enshrined in the definition of negligence
in the Second Restatement of Torts."7 In other cases where
industry standards exist, the courts have used the Hand Rule, or
similar cost benefit approaches, to criticize industry standards. For
example, The T.J. Hooper, also decided by Judge Hand, has come to
stand for the principle that compliance with custom is no defense
to a tort claim.
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Unlike Judge Hand, Judge Posner believes that "the judge and
the parties should not feel compelled to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis of barge transportation from the ground up." 9 Instead,
Judge Posner examined the incentive structure for the industry and
the markets in which it operated. He reasoned that compliance
with a community standard should be a defense for an industry that
has a market relationship with its tort victims, but not otherwise.
90
When the victims are the injurer's potential customers, the bargain
that they strike in the market will reflect the cost of accidents and
their prevention. When the victims are not the injurer's potential
customers, no market relationship exists between them, so the
industry standard will usually be inefficient. 1
"Is the price and quantity of shoes efficient?" A direct answer
can be found through a cost-benefit analysis of shoe production.
Economists know, however, that the necessary information is usually
' See Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173 (determining liability based on whether
the burden is less than the probability multiplied by the loss).
87 See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1977).
18 See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
9 Rodi Yachts, 984 F.2d at 889.
90 See id. at 888-89.
9 Judge Posner explained:
[T]he principal function of tort law, it could be argued, is to protect custom-
ers' reasonable expectations that the firms with which they deal are
complying with the standard of care customary in the industry .... [T]he
standard of care in the inland trade with regard to preventing runaway
barges might be too low because it ignored some of the accident cost to
which such runaways give rise .... Since, however, these customs appear
to reflect an undistorted market determination of the best way to minimize
runaway-barge accidents, we think the focus of the district court's inquiry
should be on the parties' respective compliance with and departures from
the customs ....
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unavailable to perform such an analysis. Consequently, economists
try to answer the question indirectly, by discussing market structure
and firm behavior. Unfortunately, the proponents of economic
analysis do not show the same respect for information constraints
applicable to law. "Is a community standard of precaution effi-
cient?" Theorists typically recommend that judges answer this
question directly by applying cost-benefit techniques like the Hand
Rule. This prescription often demands more information than
judges possess.
I have explained that structural adjudication often requires less
information than cost benefit analysis. This discussion leads to a
slightly different question: How can courts conserve upon the infor-
mation required for adjudication by appropriate choice of a liability
rule? Liability can be contingent upon causation ("strict liability")
or fault ("negligence"). Economic analysis has extensively explored
the differences in the incentive effects of strict liability and negli-
gence. " Either rule can provide incentives for efficient precaution
under ideal conditions, but small errors in the two rules have
different consequences. A court that applies a negligence rule must
set the legal standard of care. The expected costs of a potential
injurer usually jump when behavior falls below the legal standard
because of the abrupt assumption of liability. As a consequence of
this jump in costs, most potential injurers will continue obeying the
legal standard, even if damages are modestly underestimated by the
courts. If the legal standard is set at an inefficient level by the
courts, most potential injurers will conform to it anyway. Thus,
under a negligence rule, a modest error in setting the legal standard
affects the level of precaution taken by potential injurers, whereas
a modest error in setting the level of damages has little effect.
In contrast, under strict liability, potential injurers balance the
cost of precaution against expected liability at the margin. There is
no legal standard for courts to set under a rule of strict liability, but
the court's computation of damages affects the marginal expected
liability of potential defendants. Even a modest error in setting the
level of damages under a rule of strict liability affects the level of
precaution taken by potential defendants.
"See Guido Calabresi &Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts,
81 YALE LJ. 1055, 1055-85 (1972); Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 205-21 (1973); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-25 (1980).
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The best liability rule for a court to adopt depends in part upon
the errors that it will make in applying the rule under conditions of
imperfect information. If courts are more inclined to make errors
in setting damages than in determining the efficient standard of
care, a negligence rule is preferable. If the converse is true (courts
are more inclined to make errors in determining the efficient
standard of care than in setting damages), a strict liability rule is
preferable.
9 3
The structural approach suggests how courts can determine their
susceptibility to error. If the game that produces social norms has
a structure that yields efficiency (long-run relations, observable
moves, low time-discounting, no spill-overs), the court can enforce
the norms with confidence. If the game does not have this
structure, the court will have to balance benefits and costs in order
to determine an efficient legal standard. Courts are more likely to
make errors when balancing benefits and costs than when observing
social norms. The courts may avoid this balancing act by adopting
a rule of strict liability. Strict liability requires the courts to
determine the harm caused by accidents, but not to balance the
harm against the cost of avoiding it. Thus, a negligence rule may be
appropriate for social norms produced by the prescribed structure,
and a rule of strict liability may be appropriate when social structure
does not yield efficient norms.
This argument may explain part of the reason why. courts have
adopted a strict liability rule for consumer product injuries. The
relationship between a particular consumer and producer may not
persist beyond the transaction. Even if it does, the value of the
future surplus is usually small relative to the stakes in a consumer
product injury suit. Consequently, the industry may not evolve
efficient norms. To impose an efficient legal standard of care, the
court would have to compute benefits and costs directly. Large
errors would result. Applying a rule of strict liability, however,
requires less information. The judge must only make a determina-
tion of causation and a computation of damages.
94
13 See Robert D. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1538-42
(1984) (discussing how difficult it is for the courts to set an efficient legal standard
of care by using successive approximations of the incremental costs and benefits
certain precautions will create).
' These remarks should notbe taken as an endorsement of the present institution
of strict product liability, which is riddled with inefficiencies. My views on this subject
are developed in Robert D. Cooter, Towards A Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75
VA. L. REV. 383, 400-05 (1989).
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C. End-Game Examples
Specialized business is often organized so that efficient norms
emerge from repeated transactions. Informal threats such as tit-for-
tat and exit are sufficient to cause most people to conform most of
the time. To illustrate, gold miners in nineteenth-century California
apparently developed effective property rules for disputed claims,
and these rules were subsequently adopted by California courts. 5
Ranchers and farmers in the western United States apparently
developed efficient rules for allocating liability for straying cattle,
independent of the legal process. 6 Nineteenth-century whalers
apparently developed efficient rules for determining ownership of
whales harpooned by more than one ship.9"
From time to time, a player will cheat on the industry practice.
The cheater is typically someone whose time horizon is so short that
the immediate gain from appropriation outweighs the advantages of
future cooperation. In these circumstances, the court can benefit
the industry and improve its efficiency by enforcing its norms
against the deviant.
A concrete example is provided by the check-collection process.
A buyer pays for goods by making a check out to the seller. The
seller deposits the check at his bank, and the check must find its
way to the maker's bank to be presented for payment. Before
reaching its destination, the check may pass through several
intermediate banks, called "collecting banks." To make this process
quick and cheap, banks have formed a variety of corporations,
associations, and networks that include branch banks, clearing
houses, correspondent banks, and the regional Federal Reserve
Banks. Corporate law, private contracts, the rules of private
associations, and public laws and regulations govern the collection
process in the United States.
98
When accident or fraud in the collection process causes funds
to be lost, these rules sometimes become the subject of litigation.
Sometimes a bank would like to violate the industry's rules in order
to avoid a large one-time loss. The theory developed in this Article
provides guidance to such litigation. The banks involved in the
95 See RICHARD 0. ZERBE, FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY IN THE CALIFORNIA GOLD
FIELDS (University of Washington GSPA Working Paper, 1996).
9 See ELLICKSON, supra note 81, at 40-64.
97 See id. at 191-206.
9 See EDWARD L. RUBIN & ROBERT D. COOTER, THE PAYMENT SYSTEM: CASES,
MATERIAL, AND ISSUES 160-68 (2d ed. 1994).
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collection process have long-run relationships with each other.
There is a strong presumption that the private agreements and
norms generated by these relations are efficient. The courts can
enforce the industry norms as applied among banks in the confi-
dence that they are efficient.99
Many other examples are similar to check-collection losses. To
illustrate, accounting firms tend to have repeat customers among
businesses who are knowledgeable about finance. These relation-
ships presumably channel the development of the accounting
standards promulgated by professional associations.'00 An accoun-
tant who fails to comply with these standards usually does so by
accident. Occasionally, however, an accountant with an unusually
short time horizon, who, for example, is planning to retire or
expecting to go bankrupt, may violate the standards deliberately.
When allocating any resulting losses, the courts would do well to
enforce the professional standards.
Some legal rules can be understood as helping to foster long-run
relationships. To illustrate, consider damage rules for breach of
commercial contracts. In routine cases, American courts make one
party bear all the costs of an unforeseen contingency. In some very
large commercial contract disputes, however, the courts require the
parties to share the costs of an unforeseen contingency.' 0 ' The
structural approach suggests that clear rules for allocating routine
losses, like loser-pays-all, will promote long-run relationships. Large
losses, however, may exceed the surplus from future cooperation.
In this situation, a loser-pays-all rule might induce the parties to
scuttle the relationship and fight over loss-allocation; in contrast, a
" See Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for
Consumer Payments, 66 TEX. L. REv. 63, 86-97 (1987).
'0 Accounting standards for the United States are formally set by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"). It consists of seven members, five of whom
must agree in order to promulgate a new rule. See Allison L. Cowan, The $290,000
Job Nobody Wants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1990, at D1, D9. In recent years, the Board
has consisted of three accountants, two businessmen, an academician, and a
"representative of the investing public." Id. International accounting rules are set by
the London-based International Account Standards Committee. After 18 years of
work, it was reportedly nearing its goal of proposing some systematic, uniform
accounting rules for all countries. See Allison L. Cowan, InternationalAccountingRules
Advance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1991, at DI.
101 See Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules
for Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 541-46 (1990) (describing cases where the
courts have viewed certain long-term commercial relationships as necessarily
cooperative and, therefore, required parties to share the costs of unforeseen
contingencies).
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loss-sharing rule might preserve the relationship. So the difference
in treatment between ordinary losses and very large losses can be
understood in the context of long-run relationships among
commercial parties.
D. Spill-Overs, Exploitation
Given serendipity, social norms evolve as required by fairness
and efficiency, and the state improves the situation further by
enforcing norms when the gain from better enforcement exceeds
the cost of formalization. Sometimes, however, social norms fail to
emerge where needed, or the wrong norms emerge relative to the
standards of efficiency and fairness. I next consider these "commu-
nity failures" by analogy to market failures.
In some circumstances, state enforcement of social norms is
unfair. Some norms that are good for one community are bad for
another community. For example, one community may develop a
norm that externalizes cost on another community, or one commu-
nity may develop a norm that inhibits competition from another
community. Such a norm is unfair from the viewpoint of the
community harmed by it. The state cannotjustify enforcing a norm
that harms one community on the grounds that it arose from a
consensual process in another community.
To illustrate, neither accountants nor the businesses who hire
them have a direct interest in tailoring rules to increase the
efficiency of tax collection by the Internal Revenue Service. Norms
prescribing racial discrimination are a more sinister example of how
one community can impose costs on another. Discrimination
permits one community to reduce competition from another, which
benefits the dominant group at the expense of the subordinate
group. The stability of racial cartels, however, depends upon a high
level of internalization of the discriminatory norm in the dominant
group. Instead of internalizing the discriminatory norm, if many
people in the dominant group conform adventitiously, free-riding
will dilute the enforcement effort and eliminate discrimination's
aggregate effects, even though a significant group of people
continue to discriminate. Like other cartels, racial cartels suffer
from instability, which is why discriminators seek to enact their
practices into law.
°2
102 See Robert D. Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIECO L. REV. 133,153
(1994).
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Sexual discrimination is more perplexing to the theory of norms
because men and women belong to the same community. How is
it possible for social norms prescribing the subordination of a group
of people to arise in the community to which they belong? I suspect
that in order for a discriminatory norm to arise in a community that
includes its victims, the injurers must have power over the means of
representation. Power over the means of representation enables the
dominant group to frame the public debate by which norms evolve.
For example, control over communication and schooling filters the
content of moral debate and moral education. Limitations of space
prevent me from developing this suggestion more fully.
E. Individual Against Community
The preceding discussion of spill-overs raises the possibility that
enforcing community norms could contribute to the exploitation of
one group by another. Similarly, enforcing community norms could
deprive individuals of their rights. A profound meditation on this
problem is contained in a series of papers on defamation by Robert
Post. According to Post, a community consists of people who take
shared norms into their personal identity, including rules of civil
speech. Civility rules protect both the community's identity and the
reputation of its members. Incivility that threatens the community
is (or was) a common law crime, and incivility that damages
someone's reputation is a tort.
103
Post goes on to argue that a free market for ideas, in which
different conceptions of the public good contend for the allegiance
of citizens, is central to democracy. Community norms of civility
restrict the market for ideas. Consequently, democracy and
community collide in the courtroom when adjudicating the First
Amendment. The "primary dynamic" that underlies development
of First Amendment law, according to Post, "is the separation of
"s According to Robert Post, the defendant originally carried the burden of
proving the truth of defamatory speech. The burden shifted around the turn of this
century, after which the plaintiff had to prove falsity of uncivil speech. See Robert C.
Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HAtv. L. REV. 601, 619 (1990)
[hereinafter Post, Constitutional Concept]. Furthermore, the truth of the speech is a
complete defense against an alleged tort of defamation, whereas the truth of the
speech was no defense against an alleged invasion of one's right to privacy. See
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Sef in the Common
Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 980 (1989) (citing Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967,
969 (Ky. 1927)).
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public discourse from the domination of civility rules that define the
identity of communities."
10 4
Community norms abrade individual rights in other areas of law
besides defamation and free speech, as illustrated by a case
involving a religious sect in a small town in Ohio in 1947. Andrew
Yoder sued four officials of the Amish Church, who had ordered its
members to shun him ("meidung") for leaving the church and
purchasing a car. Yoder argued that shunning deprived him of free
exercise of religion and ruined his health (he had stomach ulcers).
The jury awarded $5000 in damages, and the judge ordered church
officials to withdraw their order to shun Yoder. When church
officials did not respond, the sheriff seized the property of one of
the them and sold it to satisfy a portion of the debt. The sheriff was
in the process of seizing the property of another church official
when the officials caved in, paid the debt, and removed the ban,
although Yoder's isolation apparently continued even without the
ban.105
The Amish form "ultimate communities," whereas businessmen
form instrumental communities. My main topic is business
communities. Even so, my theory has something to say about the
conflict between individuals and communities. Specifically, my
theory points to two natural limits on the coercion of individuals by
communities. In my model of the agency game, the option to "exit"
enabled the players to find congenial partners. Similarly, an
individual who feels repressed by one community can often move
to another. Through mobility, an individual can escape coercion by
one community and find another community that is more congenial.
In contrast, the creation of a mass society through the destruction
of communities reduces the alternatives available to everyone. The
limits of self-help should be assessed before a court grants a legal
remedy to an individual who feels repressed by his community.
These arguments also apply to corporate culture. Different
organizations have different ways of going about their business.
Diversity among corporations increases the scope and vigor of their
competition for workers and wealth. The imposition of uniform
laws regulating the employment contract and conditions of work
reduces diversity in corporate culture. Thus the overzealous
extension of individual rights against communities and corporations
104 Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 103, at 684.
105 See Margaret Gruter, Ostracism on Trial: The Limits of Individual Rights, 7
ETHOLOGY & SocIoBIoLoGy 271, 271-79 (1986).
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reduces the scope for exercising the freedom allegedly being
protected.
F. Nonconvexity
If economies of scale are large relative to the size of a market,
then competition tends to eliminate all producers except the largest.
A more technical term for "economies of scale" is "nonconvexity."
I will explain the meaning of nonconvexity and show how noncon-
vexity can trap the players in a game.
Decentralized processes economize on information by making
local improvements. One kind of evolutionary trap occurs when
local progress is global regress. To illustrate, suppose that some
climbers try to ascend a mountain in a fog by following the rule
"Always keep going up." If the mountain has a single peak, this rule
will get them to the summit. If the mountain has several false
peaks, this rule will get the climbers to a local peak but not
necessarily to the summit. A mountain with a single peak is a
convex surface, whereas a mountain with several false peaks
contains nonconvexities. Local improvements lead to a global
maximum on a convex surface, whereas local improvements lead to
a local maximum on a nonconvex surface.
An historical example shows the problem that nonconvexity
creates for decentralized law. Everyone in a country drives on the
same side of the road, but historical accident determined whether
it is the left, as in Britain, or the right, as in most other countries.
Given a world economy, it would be better for the British to drive
on the right, like almost everyone else. Driving on the left,
however, is a stable equilibrium that will not change without central
direction. Similarly, common law countries could benefit from
abandoning the old British system of weights and measures in favor
of the metric system. Yet such a change apparently requires
centralized lawmaking, at least for consumers as opposed to
businesses."" The critics of the common law claim, in effect, that
it is a vast collection of rules similar to "Drive on the left."
" When the US. Federal Trade Commission put a rule into effect that expanded
the scope of mandatory metric measurement on consumer goods in 1994, experts
predicted that it would have almost no impact,just like the Metric Conversion Act of
1975. "[B]ecause the law only suggested that we switch to metric, there was no real
incentive to change. And government, in the face of overwhelming unpopularity,
declined to force the issue." SteveJohnson, Metric System Proponents Quietly Insert Foot
in U.S. Door, CHI. TRaB., Feb. 28, 1994, at C1.
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Humans have a strong protection against evolutionary traps that
ensnare animal communities. The human advantage comes from
the fact that norms arise from discussion and debate, which prompt
insight. Insight enables a community to distinguish between a false
summit ("local maximum") and the true summit ("global maxi-
mum"). A community that understands an evolutionary trap may
avoid it by withholding normative sanction from inefficient
equilibria. Thus, internalization filters norms for efficiency.'" To
illustrate, the problem of nonconvexities often arises in setting
industrial standards. Private firms have been successful at setting
standards voluntarily, even in international business.
10 8
G. Intermediate Institutions
I have developed a theory of the spontaneous evolution of
norms. In reality, however, many norms are made by intermediate
institutions, rather than evolution. Organizations make rules for
members, typically by following a legislative process such as majority
vote. The forms of representation are quite distinct from one
organization to another. To illustrate, the Visa Corporation is a for-
profit nonstock company in which the member-banks vote in
proportion to their billings through the system. 9 In contrast, the
American Economics Association governs itself by a board of
directors elected by members from slates proposed by the current
board of directors.
A theory of intermediate institutions would have to characterize
different types of organizations and then predict how different
governance structures will perform. While I cannot develop a
detailed theory here, I will offer a few generalizations.
Theories of collective choice, which have progressed in des-
cribing how states govern, provide the basic tools for analyzing
intermediate institutions."1 These theories assume that people
107 Taylor reaches a similar conclusion:
I shall take the view that, if a game has multiple equilibria (as the Assurance
game does) but one of them is strictly preferred to all the others by
everyone, then the Pareto-preferred one will be the outcome. On this view,
rational action in an Assurance game does not lead to a Pareto-inferior
outcome, so that this game is not a collective action problem.
TAYLOR, POSSIBILITY, supra note 9, at 19.
108 See generally ALAN SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY
INTEGRATED GOODS MARKETS (1995).
109 See RUBIN & COOTER, supra note 98, at 714-15.
"o See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11-18 (1979) (describing the reasons
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exercise political power in their own interests. Voting averages
the interests of the electorate, giving more weight to those who
control the agenda or invest resources in influencing elections.
Governance of intermediate organizations give them direction and
purpose.
Disagreements persist about the goals pursued by intermediate
institutions. On the one hand, intermediate institutions can be
viewed as providing detail and meaning to broad principles of
property and contract law, as in the preceding discussions of the
new law merchant. On the other hand, intermediate institutions
can be viewed as creating local monopolies to inhibit competition.
To illustrate the latter view, Mancur Olson asserts that, as a society
ages, intermediate institutions pursue political rents with increasing
effectiveness until "sclerosis" clogs the arteries of economic
competition.
111
The structural approach to adjudicating spontaneous norms
needs modification to apply to the rules of intermediate institu-
tions. While I cannot develop the structural approach to inter-
mediate institutions in this Article, I will briefly describe the
fault-line in it. In reality, organizations that seek to maximize
the wealth of members will pursue efficiency and monopoly. The
organization will seek to create monopoly power for members in
dealing with nonmembers. Monopoly power is achieved by the
standard devices of a cartel-price fixing, exclusive territories, and
withholding information from the public. The organization will also
seek to minimize agency costs that members incur in dealing with
each other. To minimize agency costs, the organization must create
efficient property rights and contracts among members. Thus a
general principle of motivation for intermediate organizations can
be stated: Efficiency for interests encompassed by the organization,
monopoly for outsiders. In an ideal situation, competition among
organizations deprives outsiders of monopoly power, thus limiting
the organization to the goal of efficiency among members. In the
worst situation, organizations form tight cartels to control local
markets.
for collective choice and noting the effect collective choice theories have on a
society's selection of democratic rules).
11 See Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL. SCL
REv. 567, 567-76 (1993).
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H. Competition and Common Law
Adam Smith suggested, and general equilibrium theory proved,
that competition for wealth in markets allocates resources effi-
ciently.'12 A competitive market is a social machine that allocates
resources efficiently without anyone consciously striving for that
goal. Are there such mechanisms for making law, rather than
commodities? Many laws are statutes enacted by democratic
assemblies. Democracy is a system of competition for control of the
state's monopoly on force. Unfortunately, political competition in
a democracy does not generally produce efficient laws. The
"impossibility theorems" prove that democratic constitutions cannot
be designed in principle to achieve economic efficiency."' In
modeling more specific political institutions, collective choice theory
has shown that politicians who pursue power have strong incentives
to redistribute wealth to influential groups and weak incentives to
achieve economic efficiency. Thus legislation has been depicted as
the realm of "rent-seeking," not efficiency.
14
A complete theory of decentralized lawmaking includes a
detailed account of legislation. I have suggested that legislatures
will be very active in redistribution, where social life creates a stew
of conflicting opinions, rather than a normative consensus. I have
also suggested that legislatures can appropriately make law when
nonconvexities or spill-overs cause games to fail. My view that
failures are rare in business games and norms, and that rent-seeking
by lobbyists is common, lies behind my claim that much business
law should be found, not made, by the state. Others may find that
failures in business games and norms are frequent, not rare. In any
case, the debate would be far advanced if its participants would
accept the structural approach as an intellectual framework, just as
most economists accept a common framework for debating the
regulation of industry.
The discouraging facts about legislation prompt a search for
alternative ways of making law. Much research among economists
has focused upon judge-made law, or, more specifically, common
law. Economic models have demonstrated a degree of consistency
112 See KENNETHJ. ARROW & F.H. HAHN, GENERAL COMPETIIVE ANALYSIS 75-106
(1971).
1sSee KENNETHJ. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46-60 (1951).
14 For a review of the collective choice literature, see ROBERT D. COOTER,
COLLECTIVE CHOICE THEORY: A REVIEW (John M. Olin Working Paper in Law and
Economics, School of Law, University of California at Berkeley No. 91-4, 1991).
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between the common law and economic efficiency that almost no
one anticipated when the intellectual enterprise of law and
economics first began."5 Since judges seldom explicitly decide
cases on grounds of economic efficiency, these facts raise the
question, "What is the hidden hand that directs the common law
toward efficiency?"
Litigation, especially in American courts, has many features of
a market. Litigation is costly and investing in it is often motivated
by material self-interest, like buying or selling a commodity. Is
competition between plaintiff and defendant the "hidden hand" that
directs American common law toward efficiency? Several models
have proposed mechanisms by which competition among litigants
might cause common law to evolve toward efficiency without judges
or juries consciously adopting that goal." 6 These mechanisms are
more clever than convincing, as a review of them will show.
One such mechanism is negative correlation between a rule's
efficiency and the probability that litigants will challenge it in court.
Several hypotheses have been proposed that predict such a negative
correlation." 7 One hypothesis is that inefficient laws cause more
legal disputes than efficient laws. For example, a law that provides
insufficient incentives for precaution causes more accidents and
more litigation than an efficient law.
115 Citing all the efficiency models would require footnoting almost the entire
economic analysis of law. For summaries, see ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(1992). For a critical review, see Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing. A Skeptical
Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L.
REv. 199 (1988).
IN This possibility was first raised by Rubin, supra note 18, at 51-63 (noting how
the common law derives efficient rules). See also John C. Goodman, An Economic
Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 393-406 (1978)
(advocating a theory whereby efficiency in the common law is driven by private
litigants); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules,
6J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65-82 (1977) (arguing that "efficient rules will be more likely to
endure as controlling precedents regardless of the attitudes of individual judges
toward efficiency, [or] the ability of judges to distinguish efficient from inefficient
outcomes"). For a review and rigorous formulation of these-theories, see Cooter &
Kornhauser, supra note 18.
"1
7 See Goodman, supra note 116, at 394 (explaining the relationship as a result of
the amenability ofjudges to persuasion by litigants who have unequal incentives to
win a favorable decision, with the litigant subject to the inefficient legal rule); Priest,
supra note 116, at 65 (proposing that the relationship is driven by the greater costs
imposed on litigants subject to the inefficient rules); Rubin, supra note 18, at 51
(noting the inverse relationship between the efficiency of a legal rule and the
likelihood that litigants will challenge it).
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Another hypothesis is that settling out of court is more difficult
when the rule of law is inefficient than when it is efficient. To
illustrate, vague laws create uncertainty over legal entitlements,
which inhibits bargaining aimed at resolving disputes. Experimental
evidence supports the belief among litigators that bargaining games
are hard to settle when the parties do not know each others' threat
points."' An implication is that laws whose inefficiency derives
from their vagueness will tend to be litigated until the courts clarify
the underlying entitlements." 9
Yet another mechanism concerns cooperation in clarifying the
law. Allocative efficiency requires resources to be owned by the
people who value them the most. If the law allocates legal entitle-
ments to parties who do not value them the most, the inefficiency
can often be cured by private exchange. 2 Transaction costs may
block private exchange, however, in which case the allocative
inefficiency must be cured by changing the law. The parties who
stand to gain may cooperate in attempting to change it. An
implication is that inefficient laws will be litigated when transaction
costs obstruct private exchange of the underlying entitlements.
121
So far, I have discussed a possible correlation between efficiency
and litigation rates. Another form of bias toward efficiency is a
positive correlation between the efficiency of a litigated rule and the
probability that it will survive a court challenge. The litigation
market could create such a correlation even though judges give no
intrinsic weight to efficiency.
"
8 See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some
Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73, 91-98 (1982) (noting experimental evidence
which seems to suggest that bargaining games with numerous parties seem to be
aided by full information).
"' George Priest tried to test whether changes in doctrine by judges, which
increase uncertainty, cause an increase in the scope of disagreement among litigants.
His data apparently show that doctrinal change and increased disagreement occur in
the same year, but not which occurs first. The facts that he observed are consistent
with his hypothesis or with the rival hypothesis that changes in doctrine resolve
uncertainties that cause litigants to disagree. See George Priest, Measuring Legal
Change, 3J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 193, 193-225 (1987); Robert D. Cooter, Why
Litigants Disagree: A Comment on George Priest's 'Measuring Legal Change', 3J.L. ECON.
& ORGANIZATION 227, 227-34 (1987).
" Coase, supra note 42, applied this reasoning to law and concluded that
inefficient allocations of legal entitlements will be cured by private exchange provided
that the parties can contract around the legal rule at low cost. There are many
commentaries, including Robert D. Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1982).
1' This is apparently Rubin's line of thought in his pioneering article. See Rubin,
supra note 18, at 59.
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To see why, consider the fact that a litigant who is willing to
spend more on a case can obtain more effort from better lawyers.
More effort from better lawyers results in higher quality legal
arguments. Judges are favorably influenced by the quality of legal
arguments. Larger litigation expenditures thus increase the
probability of winning a case. If people are willing to invest more
to challenge inefficient rules than to defend them, the responsive-
ness of judges to high quality legal arguments may cause them to
overturn inefficient rules. This mechanism could operate even in
the absence of any commitment on the part of judges to efficiency
as a legal value.
There is a reason why people may be willing to spend more to
challenge an inefficient rule than to defend it. An inefficient rule
allocates a legal entitlement to someone who values it less than
someone else. The party who values the entitlement more will be
inclined to spend more to challenge the rule and obtain the
entitlement than the other party will be inclined to spend to defend
the rule and retain the entitlement. 22 So an inefficient allocation
of an entitlement may provoke more expenditure on litigation to
challenge it than to defend it.
The preceding hypotheses imply that inefficient laws will be
litigated more extensively and more intensively than efficient laws.
Unfortunately, all hypotheses based upon selective-litigation
pressure fail because of a common flaw. To understand the flaw,
consider an analogy between legal precedents and scientific
discoveries. Some scientific discoveries, including basic principles,
are unpatentable. Insofar as scientific discoveries are unpatentable,
investors in research cannot capture the full value of their discov-
eries. Rules of law are like basic scientific research in this respect.
A law is general in the scope of its application. Challenging a law
affects everyone who is, or will be, subject to it. The effects of a
new, more efficient precedent spill far beyond the litigants in the
case in which it is set. Consequently, most plaintiffs appropriate no
more than a fraction of the value the new precedent creates and
redistributes.
Litigants, however, typically have little regard for the social costs
that inefficient rules impose on others. The tendency of selective
litigation toward efficiency may be overwhelmed by the inclination
12 For the first systematic development of this argument, see Goodman, supra
note 116.
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of plaintiffs to challenge laws when they can capture a large share
of the precedent's value. Plaintiffs typically sue when they expect
the redistributive gains of successful litigation to be large, regardless
of the law's efficiency or inefficiency. The problem with viewing
litigation as a market is that redistribution is more important than
efficiency. The market for litigation, like the market for basic
scientific research, fails badly relative to the standard of economic
efficiency.
I have shown that selective-litigation pressure and blind
evolution fail to explain the level of efficiency observed in common
law. If law is not directed toward efficiency by the hand of the
judge or the hidden hand of competition, why are efficiency models
so successful in explaining common law rules? The traditional
conception of the common law provides an answer. According to
the traditional conception, courts enforce social norms that arise
outside of the legal system. The common law tends toward
efficiency because the underlying social norms tend toward
efficiency. The absorption of the medieval law merchant into
common law is a case in point. Thus, the efficiency of the common
law rests upon the efficiency of social norms, whose existence
precedes the law. If this argument is correct, law-and-economics
scholars have been looking in the wrong place for the law's hidden
hand of efficiency. The right place to look is the theory of games
and norms.
CONCLUSION
The theory developed in this Article argues that the lawmaker's
role is to find community norms, apply the structural test, and
enforce the norms that pass the test. To formulate the hypothesis
that a norm exists, the norm should be stated explicitly. An explicit
statement includes the norm's subjects, character, act, conditions,
and sanction. To test the hypothesis that the norm exists in a
community, the lawmaker must assess evidence concerning its
internalization. For some forms of cooperation, but not all,
everyone has an incentive to signal cooperation. When signaling
converges with the public good, some people will become convinced
that they should conform to the practice, and they will train the
young to conform. The people who represent themselves as
obeying the practice will say that it is fair. If everyone represents
himself as obeying the practice, a consensus will form that the
practice is fair. When enough people internalize the obligation, a
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norm emerges in the community. Economics, which lacks a
compelling theory of endogenous preferences, has much to learn
from sociology and psychology about the process by which individu-
als internalize norms.
Internalizing a norm has two significant effects upon behavior.
First, people who have internalized a norm would obey it even when
doing so does not serve their narrow self-interest. This kind of
behavior has little effect upon the aggregate level of conformity to
a business norm. Since competition eliminates behavior involving
substantial self-sacrifice, little of it is required by the norms that
evolve in a business community. Second, people who feel that a
norm should be obeyed tend to criticize or punish others who
violate the norm. A significant proportion of people violate many
norms. Punishment of violators increases their expected costs, thus
increasing the aggregate level of conformity to the norm.
Once the lawmaker confirms the hypothesis that a norm exists,
the next step in adjudication is to apply structural tests to determine
whether the norm should be enforced. The structural tests combine
the theory of games and the theory of norms. Production involves
cooperation, and cooperation creates the risk of appropriation.
Individuals attempt to solve the problem of cooperation informally
through relationships and promises. The level of cooperation,
however, tends to be lower than required for economic efficiency.
An increase in the proportion of cooperators benefits everyone.
Thus more cooperation is socially efficient.
Economic specialization constantly widens information deficits
for courts. To overcome the deficit, adjudication requires a
structural approach. In a structural approach, the courts decide
whether to enforce a social norm by inquiring into the incentives by
which it arose, rather than attempting to weigh costs and benefits
directly. A structural approach is more decentralized because
lawmakers must rely upon specialized institutions to create norms
for themselves. The incentive structure producing a social norm
determines whether its enforcement by the state is efficient and fair.
From this viewpoint, a "community failure," analogous to a "market
failure," can leave a normative gap. The majority might fill the gap
by legislation. The incentive structure for the evolution of social
norms will determine where such gaps occur. Thus, the role of
majority rule is to correct for failures in the "market for norms."
The structural approach bears upon an old debate in jurispru-
dence about whether judges make law or find it. The finding of
law, not the making of it, is alleged to be the original conception of
16951996]
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the common law process.' Scholars generally accept, however,
that American courts now make law in light of public policy. The
older conception that judges find law has been largely abandoned,
but the theory of games and norms can revitalize that older
conception. According to the theory developed in this Article, a
common law court should find that a social norm is law if it evolved
from an appropriate incentive structure. An appropriate incentive
structure is one in which incentives for signaling by individuals align
with the public good (long-run relations, convexity, no spill-overs).
Social norms that evolve from an appropriate incentive-structure
already have the community's authority in them. Recovering this
conception grows more urgent as the economy's complexity
increases.
12 According to the original conception of English common law, the King's court
supplied rules of pleading, but there was no body of substantive law distinct from
custom. The original "structural approach" emphasized that enforceable customs
existed from "time immemorial" and that they were "reasonable." GERALD J.
POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 3-38 (1986); see also DAVID
LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 122-43 (1989) (detailing the development ofcommon
law underJudge Mansfield, and claiming that Mansfield "provided a most forceful
vindication of the common law's continued capacity to develop legal remedies in
response to new social needs"). For another view of the common law, see A.W.B.
Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theoty, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 77,
80 (2d ed. 1973). I benefitted from discussions of this issue with David Lieberman.
